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ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of the present doctoral thesis is to investigate subjective experiences and 
cognitive processes in four different types of altered states of consciousness: naturally 
occurring dreaming, cognitively induced hypnosis, pharmacologically induced sedation, and 
pathological psychosis. Both empirical and theoretical research is carried out, resulting in four 
empirical and four theoretical studies. The thesis begins with a review of the main concepts 
used in consciousness research, the most influential philosophical and neurobiological theories 
of subjective experience, the classification of altered states of consciousness, and the main 
empirical methods used to study consciousness alterations. Next, findings of the original 
studies are discussed, as follows. Phenomenal consciousness is found to be dissociable from 
responsiveness, as subjective experiences do occur in unresponsive states, including 
anaesthetic-induced sedation and natural sleep, as demonstrated by post-awakening 
subjective reports. Two new tools for the content analysis of subjective experiences and 
dreams are presented, focusing on the diversity, complexity and dynamics of phenomenal 
consciousness. In addition, a new experimental paradigm of serial awakenings from non-rapid 
eye movement sleep is introduced, which enables more rapid sampling of dream reports than 
has been available in previous studies. It is also suggested that lucid dreaming can be studied 
using transcranial brain stimulation techniques and systematic analysis of pre-lucid dreaming. 
For blind judges, dreams of psychotic patients appear to be indistinguishable from waking 
mentation reports collected from the same patients, which indicates a close resemblance of 
these states of mind. However, despite phenomenological similarities, dreaming should not be 
treated as a uniform research model of psychotic or intact consciousness. Contrary to this, 
there seems to be a multiplicity of routes of how different states of consciousness can be 
associated. For instance, seemingly identical time perception distortions in different 
alterations of consciousness may have diverse underlying causes for these distortions. It is also 
shown that altered states do not necessarily exhibit impaired cognitive processing compared 
to a baseline waking state of consciousness: a case study of time perception in a hypnotic 
virtuoso indicates a more consistent perceptual timing under hypnosis than in a waking state. 
The thesis ends with a brief discussion of the most promising new perspectives for the study of 
alterations of consciousness. 
Keywords: altered state of consciousness, baseline state of consciousness, content analysis, 
distortions of time perception, dreaming, hypnosis, perception of duration, phenomenal 
consciousness, psychosis, sedation, sleep, stream of consciousness, subjective experience, 
wakefulness. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Human individuals are unique in the momentary and lifelong collection of their contents of 
consciousness, or subjective experiences, which include – but are not limited to – sensations, 
feelings, thoughts, and beliefs. Typically, the contents of consciousness are complex and 
dynamic, with an extremely wide range of possible experiences that continuously adapt to 
internal and external stimuli as well as to other subjective experiences. While in standard 
social situations we are relatively successful in guessing subjective experiences of other 
individuals by drawing inferences from their behaviour and affective display (Ames, 2005), it 
proves to be very difficult to measure the contents of consciousness with scientific methods. 
The task becomes even more complicated when a participant undergoes an alteration of 
consciousness, such as during the transition from waking consciousness to sleep dreaming. 
The most challenging task is a scientific assessment of subjective experiences of an individual 
who loses capacity to respond in an altered state of consciousness (ASC), such as during sleep 
or general anaesthesia. Nevertheless, any general theory of consciousness and its neural basis 
should also describe, predict and explain the alterations of consciousness that happen under 
different circumstances. 
The problem of the detection of consciousness can be addressed with objective methods, 
such as the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), with subjective methods, such as 
analysis of verbal reports and questionnaires, or with a combination of both types of methods. 
For instance, analysis of neurophysiological data can make it possible to distinguish which of 
the two competing images participants perceive in the binocular rivalry paradigm (Haynes & 
Rees, 2005), or to evaluate if an unresponsive vegetative state patient follows mental imagery-
related instructions (Owen et al., 2006). In a recent study, machine-learning-based analysis of 
fMRI data even enabled prediction above chance level of the visual contents of non-rapid eye 
movement (NREM) sleep dreaming (Horikawa et al., 2013). Yet, despite an invaluable 
progress, studies using objective methods are limited by the predictability of the contents of 
consciousness, i.e., they rely on the recognition of neural activity patterns that emerge in 
association with the standardized contents of consciousness. For instance, a recent study on 
dream content detection relied on the neural similarity between relatively simple perceptual 
experiences in waking and sleep onset (Horikawa et al., 2013), which may not hold for more 
intense and unpredictable rapid eye movement (REM) sleep dreaming or other unresponsive 
states of consciousness with complex spontaneously developing subjective experiences. 
Furthermore, neuroimaging-driven prediction is not explanation, while the ultimate goal of the 
science of consciousness is the explanation of how subjective experiences arise from brain 
activity. 
Compared to the objective methods, content analysis of subjective reports enables a very 
detailed assessment of naturally and spontaneously occurring subjective experiences, 
including, but not limited to, such diverse contents of consciousness as Self and body, visual 
experiences, perception of sound, temporal and spatial distortions, and so on. Arguably, a 
detailed mapping of human phenomenology in different states of consciousness will 
eventually provide a solid ground for research into the neural basis of consciousness. While 
subjective methods alone are not able to provide sufficient insight into the neural mechanisms 
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of consciousness, a combination of both objective and subjective methods will probably 
become one of the most promising avenues of consciousness research in the near future. 
Nevertheless, it is not straightforward to combine subjective and objective methods, and they 
are still being developed largely separately. Likewise, this dissertation will focus mostly on the 
application and development of subjective methods, which will be used to describe the 
phenomenal contents of ASCs.  
The main goal of this doctoral thesis was to investigate subjective experiences and 
cognitive processes in four different alterations of consciousness: dreaming, hypnosis, 
sedation, and psychosis. Individual studies focused on the development of new experimental 
paradigms and content analysis methods, systematic comparison of different alterations of 
consciousness, and contribution to the theoretical issues underlying research of ASCs. In the 
following sections, after reviewing the main concepts used in consciousness research, the 
most influential philosophical and neurobiological theories of subjective experience, the 
classification of ASCs, and the main empirical methods to study consciousness alterations, 




Consciousness science is a multidisciplinary field in the intersection between philosophy, 
experimental psychology, neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Given a large number 
of competing theories and approaches, it is natural that many of the key concepts used in 
consciousness research, such as awareness, access consciousness or unconsciousness, are 
often used in different and partly controversial meanings. To minimize conceptual confusion, 
these terms should be carefully defined, searching for the most accurate match between our 
semantics and the natural kinds of human mind. 
2.1. The key concepts and distinctions 
2.1.1. Phenomenal consciousness 
When scientists and philosophers discuss the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995; 
see Section 2.4), they primarily mean phenomenal consciousness, which is the most 
fundamental term in contemporary research of subjective experiences. The concept of 
phenomenal consciousness refers to the presence of a subjective aspect in a wide range of 
mental functions, including perception, emotion, memory, attention, language, decision 
making, and control of motor output (Block, 1995; Revonsuo, 2006). When we say a word, 
touch a tablecloth or remember what we have seen during the last trip abroad, these acts are 
usually accompanied by internal experiences, which are subjective and available only to us. As 
Nagel (1974) phrased, an organism is conscious if ‘there is something it is like to be that 
organism’ (p. 436), that is, if it has experiences that bear distinctive subjective qualities – often 
referred to as qualia (Lewis, 1929) – for the organism (see also Section 2.3). 
2.1.2. Sensory awareness 
Phenomenal consciousness is sometimes equated with awareness, however, the latter 
concept is narrower and refers to a special type of phenomenal consciousness: the presence 
of sensory experiences triggered by real physical stimuli of which we thereby become aware. 
In particular, each of the classical sensory systems, i.e., vision, hearing, olfaction, gustation and 
somatosensory system, has not only unique receptive fields, cellular receptors, central 
pathways and cortical networks (Møller, 2003), but also unique sensory qualities of 
experience. We not only detect a leaf falling from a tree, but also have a subjective awareness 
of that leaf, awareness that does not seem necessary for the detection itself. Naturally, 
phenomenal consciousness within each sensory system is often conceptualized as visual 
awareness (Koivisto et al., 2006), auditory awareness (Gutschalk et al., 2008), olfactory 
awareness (Li et al., 2010), gustatory awareness (Verhagen, 2007), or somatosensory 
awareness (Schubert et al., 2006). Notably, phenomenal consciousness as a broader term also 
includes, for instance, internally generated hallucinatory experiences, or subjective 
experiences related to non-sensory mental functions, such as semantic processing. That is, 
awareness is a type of phenomenal consciousness triggered by external physical stimuli or 
internal physiological processes in a case of interoceptive awareness (Critchley et al., 2004), 
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whereas phenomenal consciousness refers to the subjective experience itself, regardless of 
what triggered it, external or internal stimuli, thoughts, or memories. 
2.1.3. Access consciousness, reflective consciousness, cognitive accessibility 
Subjective experiences can be attended to and information about them distributed within a 
broader neural network for further information processing, leading to various cognitive and 
behavioural effects. This implicates that phenomenal consciousness can be described 
functionally. Functional interactions between phenomenal consciousness and broader 
cognitive systems guiding rational behaviour have been termed as access consciousness (Block, 
1995). Block (1995) argued for a double dissociation between phenomenal consciousness and 
access consciousness, i.e., subjective experiences might exist without being broadcasted to the 
executive processes, whereas functional causal roles of access consciousness may be achieved 
without the presence of subjective experiences. Revonsuo (1995a, 2006) pointed out that such 
a definition of access consciousness allows a subjectively unconscious person to be called 
conscious, leading to a conceptual contradiction. Instead, a theoretically more coherent 
approach may be a separation of two levels of consciousness: the first fundamental level 
would be phenomenal consciousness and the second higher level would consist of cognitive 
operations over selected subjective experiences held in working memory (Revonsuo, 2006). 
Farthing (1992) termed the second higher-order level as reflective consciousness, although this 
term may be somewhat too narrow, as the concept of reflective consciousness is sometimes 
described in terms of abstract thinking and verbalization of subjective experiences 
(Bartolomeo et al., 2008), whereas cognitive operations over phenomenal consciousness also 
include more basic cognitive processes that are not necessarily verbalized, such as selective 
attention or difference detection (Revonsuo, 2006). In more recent studies, Block (2007, 2011) 
toned down the arguments regarding dissociation between phenomenal and access 
consciousness, and instead of these terms started using the concepts of phenomenology and 
cognitive accessibility, the latter of which is defined as the broadcasting of subjective 
experiences within the central processing system. The concepts of phenomenology and 
cognitive accessibility (Block, 2007) seem to be compatible with the distinction between 
phenomenal and reflective consciousness (Farthing, 1992; Revonsuo, 2006). 
2.1.4. Contents vs. state of consciousness 
Subjective experiences are sometimes termed as phenomenal contents of consciousness, 
which refers to the variety of experiences that are contained or occur in phenomenal 
consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006). Most of the phenomenal contents of consciousness are also 
representational contents, i.e., they seem to be representing specific aspects of the physical 
world (Chalmers, 2000). Even though not all subjective experiences have veridical physical 
referent, for example, some bizarre dream experiences or hallucinations may be unrelated to 
the actual physical world, they still typically do appear for an experiential subject as 
representing external reality. The totality of phenomenal contents forms the state of 
consciousness, i.e., an overall pattern of subjective psychological functioning (Tart, 1972). 
Alongside a theoretical distinction between the presence of specific contents of consciousness 
and the presence of an overall state of consciousness, two independent neurophysiological 
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research programs are currently developing in the empirical science of consciousness. 
Research on the phenomenal contents of consciousness focuses on the neural mechanisms of 
specific subjective experiences, for example, detection of masked visual targets (Mathewson 
et al., 2009), while ignoring other simultaneously occurring contents of consciousness. By 
contrast, neuroimaging research of the state of consciousness typically contrasts the conscious 
state with the loss or the absence of consciousness in conditions such as regaining of 
consciousness after its loss due to the administration of anaesthetic agents (Långsjö et al., 
2012). 
2.1.5. Altered vs. baseline states of consciousness 
Compared to the standard waking state of consciousness, which could be regarded as a 
baseline state of consciousness, human consciousness may undergo various neurocognitive 
alterations, such as those observed in dreaming, hypnosis or meditation. Such alterations are 
often referred to as altered states of consciousness (ASCs) (Tart, 1975), and they are typically 
individuated by specific changes in their contents (Chalmers, 2000) and/or their induction 
techniques (Vaitl et al., 2005) (see Section 3.1). Complementing the classical neurological 
approach of studying abnormal in order to understand normal, ASCs can be used as important 
contrast conditions for studying human consciousness and the breakdown of its fundamental 
properties (Hobson, 2001; Revonsuo, 2006). 
2.1.6. Conscious, unconscious, and nonconscious processes and states 
Phenomenal contents do change rapidly, and a stimulus of which we were aware a couple of 
seconds ago may not be a part of the current contents of consciousness. Nevertheless, some 
of the dissipated contents may re-enter phenomenal consciousness after, for instance, 
episodic memory retrieval (Düzel et al., 1997). By contrast, some other neural processes are 
never associated with the phenomenal contents of consciousness, for example, the early 
latency (55 ms) of visual evoked potential C1 (Di Russo et al., 2002) indicates that we are not 
directly aware of neural processes underlying its generation, as visual awareness-related 
electroencephalography (EEG) potentials occur in the time latencies above 100 ms (Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2010). Neural activity patterns that are not associated with conscious experiences 
but could, under some circumstances, produce phenomenal consciousness can be termed as 
unconscious contents, whereas nonconscious processes are those deprived of capacity to reach 
phenomenal consciousness (Searle, 1992). A similar distinction can be drawn between 
conscious, unconscious and nonconscious states of mind. A conscious state would contain at 
least one subjective experience, whereas unconscious state, such as deep NREM sleep, may 
have no qualia, but would maintain a potential to become conscious if some dream 
experiences would emerge (see Section 3.6). Nonconscious states of the brain/mind are those 
that have no capacity to support phenomenal consciousness, such as irreversible coma 
(Silverman et al., 1970). By definition, there are no unconscious contents in the nonconscious 
state of the brain/mind. 
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2.2. Fundamental properties of consciousness 
Given that subjective experiences accompany a very wide range of sensory, cognitive and 
behavioural functions, most of which have a large number of sub-functions, phenomenal 
consciousness turns out to be a very diverse and generic brain process. For instance, not only 
has each modality of sensory awareness exclusive experiential qualities, but each sensory 
system codes a large number of unique stimuli features that are associated with unique qualia. 
Thus, for example, visual awareness is comprised of experiences of colour (Vul & MacLeod, 
2006), motion (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000), depth (Brouwer et al., 2005), and location 
(Huang et al., 2007). While simple sensory qualities may accompany the realm of sensory 
awareness, more complicated experiences of, for instance, understanding and remembering 
may be associated with complex cognitive functions, such as semantic processing (Kiefer & 
Spitzer, 2000) or autobiographic memory (Piolino et al., 2003). In the latter cases, subjective 
experiences do not reflect physical properties of stimuli but instead they point to the higher 
order phenomenal qualities such as subjective certainty (Tulving, 1985) or an awareness of 
semantic ambiguities (Zipke et al., 2009). 
When focusing on a specific type of subjective experiences in a restricted experimental 
setup, phenomenal consciousness seems to be a constellation of a vast number of subjective 
experiences that emerge, develop and vanish in isolation from other experiences. Thus, for 
example, research on participant’s awareness of changing ambiguous Necker cubes (Intaitė et 
al., 2013), while being an interesting visual phenomenon in itself, seems to have no connection 
to other subjective experiences that may occur during the same experiment, including feelings 
of hunger, boredom, or guilt after missing a stimulus, a tingling sensation in a shoulder, 
hearing of the background noise, or seeing objects in the peripheral visual field. However, 
introspection of our own experiences reveals that phenomenal consciousness, despite its 
richness and dynamics, is normally unified and coherent, forming a consistent complex model 
of external and internal environment (Revonsuo, 2006). 
James (1890) argued that there is continuity in the diversity of phenomenal experiences, 
which can be conceptualized as the stream of consciousness, pointing to the constantly 
changing, yet coherent and continuous, contents of phenomenal consciousness. Continuity of 
the stream of consciousness depends on the temporal and spatial unity or binding of 
individual subjective experiences (Dainton, 2006; Revonsuo, 2006). Even though each distinct 
experience may occur at different points in the phenomenal space and time, they are joined 
together into a coherent flow of a single unified stream of consciousness. That is, we do not 
have an experience of unrelated sensations that jump in time and space, although this may 
take place in certain psychiatric or neurological conditions such as schizophrenia (Vogeley & 
Kupke, 2007) or akinetopsia (Zeki, 1991), but an experience of spatially and temporally bound 
qualities that form a single stream of consciousness. The concept of consciousness-related 
binding refers to the experienced phenomenal unity of the contents of consciousness, and it 
should be demarcated from the stimulus-related binding, which refers to the coherence of 
neural representations of external physical objects that may or may not become the 
phenomenal contents of consciousness (Revonsuo, 1999, 2006). 
In addition to the temporal and spatial binding of phenomenal contents, they are also 
bound together across different mental domains, including sensory, executive, semantic and 
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motor functions. Such multifunctional integration of subjective experiences brings together 
different types of qualia into a coherent perception of the world, for example, while talking 
with a friend, we may experience visual awareness of her face, auditory awareness of verbal 
sounds, and semantic awareness of the meaning of words, which may further surprise us or 
trigger some autobiographical memories. 
2.2.1. Temporal binding 
Temporal binding of the phenomenal contents of consciousness integrates subjective 
experiences over time. In phenomenal consciousness, temporal binding can be studied in 
terms of perception of duration and simultaneity (Kiverstein, 2010). Perception of duration is 
typically associated with integration of the same set of qualia over time, for example, we may 
feel that the experience of a bee whose flying trajectory we just followed lasted for a certain 
interval of time, e.g., 3 seconds. Possibly, the same neuronal populations representing the bee 
continued oscillating and synchronizing their activity during this period of time (Engel & Singer, 
2001), and subjectively we experienced it as a single temporally extended percept of the bee. 
Interestingly, it has been shown that perceptual or attentional sampling of sensory 
information is not completely continuous, but instead it oscillates in the theta (4–8 Hz) or 
alpha (8–12 Hz) frequency range (Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson et al., 2009; Ng et al., 2012). 
Phenomenally we are not aware of such temporal snapshots underlying our perception, and 
their mechanisms operate at the nonconscious level of processing (see Section 2.1.6). 
While perception of duration is often associated with awareness of a single object, 
perception of simultaneity points to the integration of several different sets of qualia over 
time, i.e., we may experience the flying bee and the still honeybush at the same time. Contrary 
to simultaneity, perception of asynchrony or temporal order reveals a temporal succession of 
different phenomenal contents of consciousness. In these cases, the temporal binding unifies 
the change from one subjective experience to another over a wider interval of time. This 
aspect of temporal binding likely involves neurocognitive mechanisms of phenomenal 
consciousness: the just-experienced contents of consciousness are kept in the iconic memory, 
while we experience the present contents, anticipating the subsequent ones. The tripartite 
temporal structure of consciousness is sometimes referred to as the specious present – the 
temporally extended phenomenal experience of now (Dainton, 2006; Kelly, 1882). The widest 
temporal binding of phenomenal contents of consciousness depends on the autobiographic 
memory, which integrates phenomenal experiences over many days and years, constituting 
the basis for self-consciousness, also called autonoetic consciousness (Piolino et al., 2003; 
Tulving, 1985; Wheeler et al., 1997). 
2.2.2. Spatial binding 
Spatial binding of the phenomenal contents of consciousness refers to the integration of 
subjective experiences in space. Each stimulus-driven experience has a specific location in 
relation to other experiences, which is studied under the concept of location binding 
(Treisman, 1996). Furthermore, experiences typically have a defined location with respect to 
our own body that forms the centre of phenomenal space (Revonsuo, 2006). The egocentric 
reference point is typically located in the phenomenal head or chest and it can be used to 
Consciousness 20
identify the location of other phenomenal contents of consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006). 
Phenomenal spatiality, while typically studied in the visual domain (Clark, 2000), is inherent 
not only for every sensory modality but also for emotions and feelings (Nummenmaa et al., 
2014). While visual and auditory experiences are typically localized in the phenomenal space 
outside our bodily space, tactile or emotional stimuli are primarily located within the 
phenomenal body. Notably, various experimental manipulations can reallocate experiences 
from the external phenomenal space to the internal bodily space or vice versa. For example, 
identical auditory stimuli presented binaurally through the headphones might be subjectively 
felt as localized inside the head (Hartmann & Wittenberg, 1996), whereas presentation of 
conflicting visual-somatosensory input in virtual reality may shift the self-centre outside of the 
physical body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Nevertheless, spatial unity of experiences is 
maintained even in such unexpected and artificial distortions, indicating the robustness of 
consciousness-related spatial binding. 
2.2.3. Multifunctional integration 
In addition to the temporal and spatial binding, phenomenal consciousness is integrated 
across different perceptual, cognitive and behavioural functions, leading to the multifunctional 
unity of the experience of the self in the world. Such multifunctional integration takes place 
along several different axes, including perception-perception, perception-language, and 
perception-action unity. For instance, integration of phenomenal contents across different 
sensory systems (e.g., seeing a face and hearing its speech), brings together very different 
perceptual qualia under one single stream of consciousness instead of forming two separate 
auditory and visual streams of phenomenal contents. Furthermore, conscious awareness itself 
may have a crucial role in such multisensory interactions, as in some cases only consciously 
perceived information from the dominating sensory modality is transferred to another 
modality (Palmer & Ramsey, 2012). Multisensory interactions between different sensory 
modalities may also underlie generation of spatial awareness (Clavagnier et al., 2004) and 
bodily self-consciousness (Blanke, 2012). Another type of multifunctional integration takes 
place in the form of perceptual-semantic binding, which enables the experience of the 
immediate meaningfulness of phenomenal contents of consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006). 
Typically, perceptual experiences are automatically bound together with semantic contents, 
leading to the spontaneously occurring recognition and linguistic conceptualization of these 
experiences. 
The first-person perspective suggests that ‘we see the very world we act in and we act in 
the world we see’ (Clark, 2009, p. 1460). If so, the integration of perception and action along a 
single unified flow of body-world interaction might be another fundamental aspect of 
consciousness, which has even been suggested to be the ontological basis of consciousness 
(O'Regan & Noë, 2001). Indeed, embodied vision seems to be dominating over subjective 
experiences during wakefulness, when we perceive and interact with the world around us. 
However, bodily and motor processes do not seem to be necessary for visual experiences to 
emerge, as, for instance, people may have rather intense visual dreams during REM sleep, 
when their muscular system is atonic. Furthermore, the neuropsychological and neuroimaging 
evidence suggests that conscious ‘vision for perception’ in the ventral visual processing stream 
and non-conscious ‘vision for action’ in the dorsal stream can be dissociated from each other 
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(Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & Goodale, 2008). Thus, perception-action integration seems 
to be a typical, but not a fundamental property of consciousness. 
2.3. The hard problem of subjectivity 
Given that phenomenal contents of consciousness are subjective and directly available only to 
the experiencing self, explaining the ontology of consciousness poses a unique problem for 
science: it violates a universal assumption that the phenomena studied by science should be 
equally available to all observers, and no observer should have a privileged access to a 
phenomenon. Even though representational contents consciousness can be successfully 
mapped using neuroimaging techniques, specific blood-flow or electrophysiological activation 
patterns do not provide access to the subjective experiential qualities (see Section 4.4). 
Consequently, there seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the objective 
neurophysiological data and the subjective contents of consciousness: even if we are certain 
that the existence of consciousness is dependent on the brain, we cannot understand how 
brain activities cause or constitute consciousness (Levine, 1983; McGinn, 1989). Reductive 
analyses of consciousness, i.e., suggestions that consciousness is identical with some types of 
brain processes or functional descriptions, always seem to be logically consistent with the 
absence of phenomenal subjective experience despite the presence of these processes 
(Chalmers, 1996; Nagel, 1974). These intuitions have been illustrated by several famous 
thought-experiments (Jackson, 1986; Nagel, 1974). Nagel (1974) argued that even if objective 
science would acquire all physical facts about humans or other mammals, we would still miss 
information about their subjective point of view. For instance, even if we would know all 
neurophysiological and behavioural facts about a bat, including its sensory echolocation 
system, we would still have no idea of ‘what is it like to be a bat’, for example, what are its 
subjective experiences of flying in the complete darkness between the trees. Likewise, the 
same argument can extended to other conscious organisms, including humans: their 
subjective point of view is always left out in an objective scientific description of behaviour 
and neurophysiology (Nagel, 1974). Jackson (1986) argued that a neuroscientist who is 
congenitally colour blind but knows all objective facts about the psychophysics and physiology 
of colour perception would still learn something new if one day her colour vision would be 
cured, which seems to indicate that there might be more to consciousness than physical facts 
about its mechanisms. 
Many of the consciousness-related research problems, such as the ability of a system to 
access its own internal states or the difference between wakefulness and sleep, seem to be 
relatively easy, i.e., they seem to be directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive 
neuroscience (Chalmers, 1995). Even though some of the easy problems of consciousness are 
not yet solved, we have a clear idea of what would be their scientific explanation: discovery 
and description of computational and/or neural mechanisms would solve each of these 
problems. Contrary to this, the problem of the material basis of conscious experience is a 
problem of a different type: it is a hard problem, which seems to resist any of the empirical 
methods available to the contemporary science (Chalmers, 1995). We do not have any idea of 
how and why subjective sensations or emotions arise from a physical basis, and yet they do. 
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Even worse, we cannot even imagine how this problem could be solved in terms of 
neurophysiological or neurochemical processes. 
The hard problem can be tackled by a number of different philosophical theories of the 
mind-body relationship, and some of these theories, such as dualism or panpsychism, do not 
seem to have the hard problem of consciousness at all. Arguably, it applies only to 
materialistic theories that aim to explain subjectivity in terms of objective physical or 
biological processes. In Section 2.4 following, some of the most influential classical and 
contemporary metaphysical theories of the mind-body relationship will be presented and 
evaluated, with a special focus on the biological approaches to the consciousness-brain 
interaction. 
2.4. Philosophical theories of the mind-body problem 
2.4.1. Classical solutions to the mind-body problem 
Throughout centuries of theoretical research, controversies between dualism versus monism, 
idealism versus realism, and rationalism versus empiricism, placed the mind and consciousness 
at the top of philosophical investigations (Crane & Patterson, 2000; Heinämaa et al., 2007). 
Dualistic approaches to the mind-body problem assume that the mind (or certain aspects of it) 
and the physical world are ontologically separate and cannot be reduced to each other. 
Proponents of substance dualism, most notably Descartes (1641), suggested that 
consciousness and the brain are different substances, which can exist independently of each 
other. Property dualists supposed the existence of one substance with two fundamentally 
different aspects, i.e., mentality and materiality, where mental properties do not exist in the 
absence of physical properties (e.g., Mill, 1843). Contrary to dualistic positions, monism 
assumed the existence of only one independent substance. For instance, La Mettrie (1748) 
defended a materialistic position (also called physical monism), arguing that consciousness has 
purely physical causes and there is no necessity to assume the existence of a separate ‘soul-
substance’. On the opposite extreme of monistic positions lied idealism (also called mental 
monism), which states that consciousness is the only ontologically real substance, whereas all 
the other material substrates are derivable from it (Berkeley, 1710), i.e., brain and other 
physical phenomena are real, but only as the subjective contents of consciousness. Further 
developments of classical solutions to the mind-body problem showed that there is no ‘pure 
dualism’ or ‘pure idealism’, but instead there are many different versions of them (Morton, 
2010), some of which continue being considered and developed. For instance, findings in 
modern physics and neuroscience may inspire brain and physics-oriented refinement of 
property dualism (Popper & Eccles, 1977) and even idealism (Bolender, 2001). 
2.4.2. Contemporary theories: from eliminativism to panpsychism 
Contemporary ontological theories of consciousness provide a wide range of solutions of how 
consciousness and the brain might be related, which indicates the lack of a single widely 
convincing ontological theory of consciousness. For instance, reductionism, one of the 
materialistic theories of the mind-body relationship, suggests that each type of mental state or 
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process is identical to some type of neural state or process (Lewis, 1966; Smart, 1959). 
According to the type-type identity theory, which is a version of reductionism, there is no 
difference between a particular neural level in the brain and consciousness. Yet, the identity 
relationship implies that certain neural processes and consciousness are sharing all properties, 
whereas conscious experiences have subjective qualitative aspects that the neural 
mechanisms do not seem to have. If so, consciousness cannot be identical or reducible to any 
of the objectively observable neural states or processes. A possible answer to this argument is 
provided by eliminativism, which states that subjective properties do not physically exist. The 
most fundamental is the existence of the brain and the whole body, while the subjective 
aspect of perception is nothing more than an epiphenomenal illusion; a misrepresentation 
about functioning of our brains without any causal power (Churchland, 1999; Dennett, 1978, 
1991). Yet, even if one agrees that consciousness is illusion, there is something left to be 
explained: how the brain can produce this subjective illusion. 
Not all ontologies of mind that take the physical world seriously seek to reduce or 
eliminate phenomenal consciousness. For instance, embodiment theories assume that 
subjective experiences depend on the physical world, but processes and entities which are 
necessary for consciousness are not limited to the brain: the contents of consciousness are 
ontologically dependant on causal relations with peripheral body as well as with external 
physical objects (Noë & Thompson, 2004; Thompson & Varela, 2001). The embodiment 
approach seems to be plausible in the case of visual perception, as one of the prerequisites of 
vision is external physical stimulation of retina, yet embodiment theories do not provide a 
satisfactory explanation of how internal subjective experiences are generated in the absence 
of behavioural embodied interactions with the world, such as during mental imagery or 
dreaming. While the embodiment approach extends physical foundations of consciousness 
from the purely brain-based mechanisms to the peripheral body and immediate physical 
stimuli, panpsychism goes further and proposes that consciousness may be just about 
everywhere. For instance, Chalmers (1996) argues that information implemented in any 
physical system, such as the brain, flowers or microwaves, is conscious, i.e., it is a natural law 
that information realized physically is phenomenally conscious (see Tononi 2001, 2012; 
Section 2.5.5). Several related proposals have been put forward by researchers arguing that 
consciousness is a property of a matter at the level of fundamental physical forces, such as 
those described by quantum mechanics (Bohm, 1990; Jibu & Yasue, 1995). However, physics- 
and information-oriented theories have difficulties in explaining why consciousness is so 
tightly related to certain processes in the brain, as demonstrated by numerous cognitive 
neuroscience studies (but see Hameroff, 2007). 
Functionalism suggests that the ontology of consciousness is determined by abstract causal 
interactions between perceptual, cognitive and behavioural processes. In fact, functionalistic 
theories propose that any mental state could be defined by sensory inputs, inner 
informational processes and behavioural outputs (Fodor, 1975; Wright, 1973). Descriptions of 
such functional interactions have been successfully used in cognitive sciences to explain 
human rationality and decision making (Clark, 2001), which fuelled expectations that 
consciousness could be explained likewise (Dennett, 1978). Importantly, the abstract level of 
functional explanations implies that biological brains are not necessary for the generation of 
consciousness, as the same abstract functions and algorithms can be implemented in different 
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physical substrates. The possibility of multiple realizations of functional interactions seems to 
provide theoretical grounds for building artificial intelligence and consciousness (Aleksander, 
2005). Yet, while being a promising theory for identifying functional roles of consciousness, 
functionalism does not escape from difficulties in explaining qualitative aspects of 
consciousness (Block, 1980), as it remains unclear why some, but not all, functional networks 
are conscious. Difficulties in conceptualizing a convincing ontological theory of consciousness 
have even led to a position called mysterianism, also known as strong emergent materialism: 
even if consciousness is a material phenomenon, the human brain may simply be too limited 
and incapable of explaining the mind-body relationship, just as, for instance, dog brains are 
incapable of understanding modern physics (McGinn, 1989, 1991). 
2.4.3. Biological approaches to consciousness 
The majority of the empirical researchers of consciousness tend to follow assumptions of 
biological naturalism, which is a scientific common sense position that consciousness is a 
qualitative, subjective, unified and (usually) representational high-level brain function (Searle, 
1992, 2007). Importantly, even though consciousness is thought to be caused by the lower 
level brain processes, it also seems to be irreducible to them and having its own causal efficacy 
to influence cognition and behaviour (Searle, 2007). Consistently with these intuitions, 
biological realism assumes that phenomenal consciousness is a real biological phenomenon 
that resides within the confines of the brain and cannot be reduced to the fundamental laws 
of physics (Revonsuo, 2006). Given that being real implies having its own causal powers (Kim, 
1992), consciousness is assumed to be subordinated to causal interactions with other neural 
processes in the brain and, through them, with the rest of the body and the physical world. 
Methodologically, biological realism proposes that subjective experiences as biologically real 
phenomena should be studied by the sciences of biology. In particular, material basis of 
consciousness should be studied within the spatial and temporal scales that are common for 
neurosciences. Further, biological realism assumes that we are not cognitively closed to the 
understanding of consciousness, but instead biological sciences, especially cognitive 
neuroscience, are (or will be) able to explain it (Revonsuo, 2006). Thus, metaphysically, 
biological realism represents the weak emergent materialism, which predicts that the 
complete understanding of the brain will explain how consciousness emerges from the brain 
processes (Revonsuo, 2010). Contrary to this, the strong emergent materialism assumes that 
the neural basis of consciousness will remain unresolved even when all facts about the human 
brain will become known to the scientific community (see Section 2.4.2). 
While explanation in physics typically involves description of universal natural laws through 
which an explanandum, i.e., the target of explanation, can be reduced to physical processes at 
the smaller spatial and temporal scales, explanation in biological sciences involves description 
of multilevel mechanisms whose causal interactions are too complex to be described by 
universal laws (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Craver, 2007; Craver & Darden, 2001). Instead, 
biologists, including cognitive neuroscientists, develop constitutive, contextual and etiological 
explanations of their explanatory target (Revonsuo, 2006). Constitutive explanations reveal 
the lower levels of a phenomenon under investigation, for example, neuronal long-term 
potentiation can be described as an emergent outcome of the lower-level NMDA receptor 
activation (Craver & Darden, 2001). Contextual explanations point to the functional roles of 
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explanandum in interaction with the higher levels of biological organization. Etiological 
explanations describe biological processes that are capable of modulating the explanandum, 
but cannot constitute it, such as abnormal developmental pathways. Consciousness is 
assumed to reside in the largely unknown phenomenal level of organization in the brain 
(Revonsuo, 2006), yet it is expected that descriptions of interactions between the cognitive, 
phenomenal and neural level of organization will eventually solve the mind-body problem 
(Bechtel & Mundale, 1999). 
However, despite continuous development of a biological research programme during the 
previous decades and its relative success in identifying some neural correlates of 
consciousness (see Section 2.5), the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness (see Section 
2.3) remains unsolved. Thus, even though cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology 
already yielded a number of fascinating discoveries and neurocognitive theories (see Section 
2.5), it remains possible that some other approaches to consciousness than the one defended 
by biological realism might prove to be more accurate. For instance, it might turn out that 
phenomenal consciousness emerges as a product of multi-level functional interactions 
between biological entities and processes, and that these interactions can be replicated in 
artificially designed systems. This would contradict the assumptions of biological naturalism 
and realism, which are regarded as an alternative to functionalism (Revonsuo, 2006; Searle, 
1984). Likewise, information integration and differentiation theory of consciousness (Tononi, 
2012; see Section 2.5.5) may loosen its ties with neuroscience, if consciousness-generating 
informational complexity would be detected or designed in non-biological systems. As long as 
the uncertainty over the neural basis of consciousness continues, it is suggested in this 
doctoral thesis to commit to a less ambitious but more open and pragmatic approach to 
consciousness than the one defended by the biological realism, at the same time following the 
main methodological suggestions of biological realism. This methodological approach will be 
called as neurobiological pragmatism. 
In the philosophy of pragmatism, scientific theories are regarded as instruments that help 
to facilitate empirical research and increase the understanding of explanandum (James, 1907). 
Theories are evaluated depending on the success of their application; when scientific progress 
diminishes, the existing theories and methodologies are replaced by new instruments that are 
more likely to facilitate further development of science. Given that currently neuroscience 
provides the most efficient tools for the advancement of the science of consciousness, 
neurobiological pragmatism would call for directing financial and human resources to the 
cognitive neuroscience studies of consciousness. Following methodologies outlined by 
biological realism (Revonsuo, 2006, see also Craver, 2007), neurobiological pragmatism would 
seek for a multilevel explanation of neural mechanisms of consciousness. However, biological 
realism assumes that a complete understanding of the neurobiology of brain would naturally 
lead to the explanation of consciousness (Revonsuo 2006, 2010), which excludes a possibility 
that consciousness might be realized as a non-biological phenomenon. Contrary to this, 
neurobiological pragmatism would propose that consciousness is most likely to be explained 
by neurosciences, however, biological explanations may not be sufficient for solving the hard 
problem of consciousness, and neurobiological pragmatism may eventually be replaced by 
‘informational pragmatism’, ‘physical pragmatism’, or some other set of methodologies. 
Nevertheless, steps towards exclusively non-biological methodologies should be carried out 
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only when the potential of neurobiological paradigms is sufficiently exploited. More likely, 
instead of abandoning biological approach, it may merge in future with other approaches, 
leading to a ‘multidisciplinary pragmatism’. Notably, neurosciences are already receiving 
substantial contributions from other sciences. Even contemporary analyses of fMRI, EEG or 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) correlates of subjective experiences, as well as 
computational neuroscience of consciousness, are hardly limited to classical biological 
methods, but instead they require collaboration between neuroscience, psychology, physics, 
signal processing and mathematics. 
Regarding metaphysical commitment, neurobiological pragmatism would remain open to 
different possibilities of the mind-body relationship, known here as a weak ontological 
pluralism. In a strong reading of ontological pluralism, it suggests that there are different kinds 
or modes of being, which allows co-existence between different ontological assumptions, as 
proposed in logic (Turner, 2010, 2012), but also discussed in the context of epistemology and 
metaphysics (Northoff, 2004). In the weak reading, ontological pluralism would suggest that 
different ontological assumptions may co-exist, but also that ontological monism may be more 
accurate. For instance, a biological approach may eventually require its extension towards 
physical accounts of consciousness, panpsychism, property dualism or dual aspect monism, 
but also a weak emergent materialism may turn out to be true. Until science and philosophy 
provide conclusive evidence and arguments, it is too early and premature to commit to a 
single ontology of consciousness, as this may hinder other more accurate, yet currently 
neglected possibilities. Importantly, none of the discussed philosophical theories of the mind-
body relationship neglects the importance of biological research, as even in substance dualism 
non-material entities are thought to be able to cause changes in the brain (Descartes, 1641), 
which subsequently can be studied empirically. Thus, successful implementation of the 
methodology of biological realism may lead to, but currently does not require, the acceptance 
of emergent materialism and is compatible with metaphysical indeterminacy. While it is 
feasible to focus on the neurobiology of consciousness, we do not know yet where we will end 
up in trying to explain the hard problem of consciousness. Some of the currently most 
influential neurocognitive theories of consciousness are detailed in the following Section 2.5. 
2.5. Neurocognitive theories of consciousness 
2.5.1. Historical sources of empirical consciousness research 
Beginnings of the modern empirical research of consciousness can be traced back to the 
behavioural psychophysics experiments conducted by Weber (1834) and Fechner (1860), who 
studied the relationship between the physical intensity of various stimuli and the threshold of 
‘just noticeable difference’ in subjective sensation of these stimuli (for review, see Frith & 
Rees, 2007). Donders (1868) developed an experimental paradigm to compare simple and 
two-choice reaction time tasks, which allowed differentiating mental and motor processes 
preceding motor responses. Duration of mental events was further investigated, although 
more introspectively, by Wundt (1862), who established the first psychology laboratory in 
Leipzig in 1879. The first empirical studies of dream content were also carried out in the 
second half of the nineteenth century (for review, see Noreika & Windt, 2008). For instance, 
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Maury (1861) investigated the influence of external stimuli on dreams, whereas Calkins (1893) 
proposed a statistical analysis of dream reports. Wundt’s student Titchener (1902) formalized 
introspection techniques and analysed consciousness by systematically breaking it down into 
elementary feelings and sensations, which led to the structuralistic theory of mind. James 
(1890) took a different approach and instead of searching for the atoms of mind emphasized 
the continuity of conscious experiences that flow as a single stream of mental states (see 
Section 2.2). Despite important theoretical advances and development of new experimental 
paradigms, most of the nineteenth century consciousness researchers relied on introspection, 
which was critically rejected by Watson (1913) and other behaviourists who argued that the 
only scientifically rigorous method to study the human mind is a search for systematic 
relationships between external stimuli and behavioural responses. 
The detailed critique of the methodology of introspectionism was soon accepted as the 
general denial of the existence of consciousness itself. During domination of behaviourism in 
the first half of the twentieth century, the topic of consciousness was removed from most of 
the scientifically oriented textbooks or university programmes of psychology. Even though 
alternative approaches to the study of mind did not completely cease, for example, research 
of principles of visual grouping led to the description of Gestalt laws of vision (Wertheimer, 
1923), they were marginalized for several decades until the development of information 
theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) enabled the mathematical account of mental processes and 
triggered the boost of cognitive psychology experiments (for review, see Frith & Rees, 2007). 
Nevertheless, it took another thirty to forty years until quantitatively oriented psychology and 
neuroscience returned to the topic of consciousness (Baars, 1988; Crick, 1994). Notable 
exceptions in the neglect of subjective experiences were split-brain studies in the 1960s and 
1970s (for review, see Gazzaniga, 2005) and empirical research of psychophysical mechanisms 
and subjective contents of dreaming, which flourished between 1953 and 1993 (for review, 
see Foulkes, 1996). 
2.5.2. Global workspace theory of consciousness 
The return of empirical sciences to the problem of consciousness was largely inspired by Baars 
(1988, 1997, 2002), who developed a global workspace theory of consciousness that seeks to 
explain consciousness through its functional interactions with other cognitive processes and 
functions, including attention, working memory, action control, problem-solving, and 
language. In particular, Baars (2002) proposed the ‘conscious access hypothesis’, according to 
which the main function of consciousness is an integration, coordination and distribution of 
different brain processes that otherwise would remain isolated, limited, and unconscious. 
Consciousness can be metaphorically described as a spotlight (i.e., the focus of attention) on a 
theatre stage, called global workspace (i.e., working memory), which is controlled by the 
theatre director (i.e., executive Self) (Baars, 2002). From a vast number of the parallel and 
unconscious information processes, consciousness identifies the most relevant process or 
representation, and distributes it widely across other cognitive functions. In the global access 
networks, unconscious resources, such as memories or automatisms, may become the 
contents of the conscious spotlight in the working memory, and subsequently may modulate 
cognitive contexts, such as expectation and intentions of Self (Baars, 2007). The spotlight of 
attention may switch from modality to modality at a rate of about 100 ms, which is considered 
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sufficient to produce the sense of phenomenal unity across different contents of 
consciousness (Baars, 1998). Depending on the contextual demands, the duration of particular 
contents of consciousness may also be extended by re-initializing loops between unconscious 
resources, working memory and contexts, which, for instance, would be needed for episodic 
and explicit learning or voluntary control of motor activity. 
Global workspace theory and models were further developed by Franklin (2003), who 
integrated it within a computation model of cognition, and Dehaene and colleagues who 
investigated neurophysiological mechanisms of the global distribution of conscious 
information in the brain (Dehaene et al., 2001; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). For instance, it 
was demonstrated that unconsciously presented backward-masked visual words evoke 
localised activation of the extrastriate, fusiform and precentral areas, whereas conscious 
presentation of words in addition activate broad frontal and parietal networks (Dehaene et al., 
2001), arguably reflecting wide access and broadcasting of conscious information (Baars, 
2007). At the electrophysiological level of description, conscious access and global 
broadcasting seem to take place through the long-distance synchronization of the beta and 
gamma frequencies (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). Yet, despite immense progress in the 
understanding of functions and neural mechanisms of conscious access, the global workspace 
theory of consciousness does not seem to offer a satisfactory account of the phenomenal 
consciousness. In fact, Baars (2007) argues that the typical consciousness-related questions, 
such as the status of qualia and the hard problem of subjectivity (see Section 2.3) do not apply 
to the global workspace theory of consciousness. This is simply because the global workspace 
theory is a theory of access consciousness, and perceptual processes outside of the cognitive 
machinery of global broadcasting, i.e., the contents of pure phenomenal consciousness, are 
regarded as pre-conscious at best (Dehaene et al., 2006). Such an approach may be successful 
in the identification of the cognitive interactions and functions of consciousness. However, it 
does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the neural mechanisms of subjective 
experience, as it assumes that there is no phenomenal consciousness independent of or prior 
to access consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness as such becomes largely eliminated from 
the theory. 
2.5.3. Micro-consciousness vs. macro-consciousness 
While Baars (1997) and Dehaene et al. (2006) argued for the global workspace theory of 
consciousness, Zeki (2003, 2007) rejected the classical notion of the unity of consciousness 
(see Section 2.2.) and proposed that consciousness exists in the form of many autonomous 
units called ‘micro-consciousnesses’. Neurological observations and measurements of 
asynchrony of visual perception suggest that micro-consciousness units are distributed in both 
space and time (Zeki, 2007; Zeki & Bartels, 1999; Zeki & ffytche, 1998). For instance, lesions in 
the visual color area V4 produce achromatopsia, but do not affect motion awareness, whereas 
lesions in the visual motion area V5 produce akinetopsia, but do not deteriorate colour 
awareness. Neurological cases seem to suggest that an intact V5 is necessary and sufficient for 
the awareness of motion, even when primary visual cortex V1 is lesioned (Zeki & ffytche, 
1998). Further, conscious perception, as opposed to unconscious information processing, may 
not involve any additional cortical region but instead it may differ by the increased activation 
level of the same cortical areas, and in principle any anatomical region of cortex could produce 
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its own micro-consciousness (Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002). Regarding temporal asynchrony of 
visual micro-consciousness units, there is evidence showing that the earliest to reach the 
required level of activation is micro-consciousness of location, followed by micro-
consciousnesses of colour, orientation and then of motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2004; Moutoussis, 
2012). 
Zeki (2003) distinguished three levels of consciousness: micro-consciousness as subjective 
perception of basic phenomenal properties; macro-consciousness, i.e., the totality of micro-
consciousness units, as subjective perception of meaningful objects; and unified consciousness 
as subjective awareness of Self. In this framework, the unity and binding are not treated as 
fundamental properties of phenomenal consciousness. Instead, temporary jumping activation 
of different areas in cortex is assumed to be sufficient for the awareness of objects and scenes 
at the macro-consciousness level of perceptual organization. Yet, even though Zeki’s research 
programme shows that isolated but conscious neuronal units may exist in the cortex, the 
suggested account of the disunity of consciousness is not consistent with our phenomenology, 
as single objects as well as more complex sceneries appear to us in a unified form rather than 
as a stream of temporary and spatially disintegrated features. Instead, the findings of Zeki et 
al. seem to point to the lower representational or information processing levels of 
consciousness. 
2.5.4. Recurrent processing as the neural basis of consciousness 
Lamme (2006) proposed that the generation of phenomenal consciousness depends on the 
recurrent information processing between different modules across hierarchical neuronal 
networks. For instance, the feedforward information sweep across regions V1, V2, V4, TE of 
the visual ventral stream is not sufficient for the generation of conscious perception, although 
it may contribute to visually guided actions. Contrary to this, recurrent processing between V1, 
V2, V4, TE and between the ventral stream and fronto-parietal networks will lead to 
reportable conscious perception. Moreover, Lamme (2006) argued that recurrent processing 
within the ventral stream is capable of generating conscious perception even when the ventral 
stream does not interact with the fronto-parietal accessibility networks. If so, the contents of 
visual awareness cannot be equated with the attentional focus and working memory (as 
opposed to Baars, 2002, 2007, see Section 2.5.2), but instead visual awareness and attention 
are doubly dissociable (Lamme, 2003, 2004).  
Hypothesized independence of phenomenal consciousness from the access and 
reportability became one of the main controversies in consciousness research (e.g., Block, 
2011; Kouider et al., 2012). In particular, given that the presence of isolated micro-
consciousness-type of processes (Zeki, 2003, 2007, see Section 2.5.3) cannot be proved 
directly as they are unreportable (see Section 4.1), there can be only indirect and thus 
questionable evidence of subjective experiences that are not available for access 
consciousness. Furthermore, it remains unclear why recurrent processing is necessary for the 
emergence of phenomenal consciousness. Possibly, the complexity of neuronal processing 
required for the generation of conscious experience cannot not be achieved instantly and 
requires temporally extended information processing, which may also point to the neural 
mechanisms of specious present (see Section 2.2.1). 
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2.5.5. Information integration theory of consciousness 
Instead of selecting specific brain regions or electric frequency bands, information integration 
theory of consciousness, developed by Tononi (2001, 2004, 2010, 2012), equates human 
conscious experience with integrated information in the brain. Each conscious experience 
rules out an extraordinarily large number of alternative perceptual possibilities, making it 
highly informative (Tononi, 2007). Further, information in conscious systems is exceedingly 
well integrated between the elements constituting such systems, and the state of each 
element causally depends on the state of other elements. Consequently, phenomenal 
contents of a conscious state cannot be divided into phenomenal contents of its elements, as 
such a disintegration of information would lead to the loss of consciousness. Given that the 
presence of consciousness can be equated with the presence of integrated information, 
empirically feasible measures of such information can be developed to detect consciousness. 
Tononi and Sporns (2003) detailed some preliminary analytic tools to assess Φ – the capacity 
of a system to integrate information. Effective information between any two given subsets of a 
system can be assessed by injecting maximum possible entropy to one of the subsets and 
measuring complexity of responses of another subset. By comparing effective connectivity 
between all possible subsets of a system, one can identify if complexes of elements exist that 
maintain integrated information Φ that is lost if some of the elements become isolated from 
the complex (Tononi, 2008). 
Tononi (2007) argued that information integration theory is consistent with 
phenomenological observations of informativeness and unity of consciousness, as well as 
psychophysical studies showing that at least 100–200 ms are required for the emergence of 
consciousness (Bachmann, 2000), which, given the neuronal processing speed, is roughly the 
time required for information to be integrated in the highly connected neuronal networks in 
the human brain. Generation of consciousness may depend on the high-level organization of 
thalamocortical networks, which seem to support both functional specialization (Zeki, 1993) 
and functional integration (Engel et al., 2001). By contrast, as predicted by the information 
integration theory, cerebellar networks consisting of an even higher number of neurons than 
cerebral cortex but lacking associative connections (Bower, 2002), do not seem to be directly 
involved in the generation of conscious experience. Likewise, consciousness is absent when 
cortical networks lose effective connectively and presumably the capacity to integrate 
information during slow wave sleep or anaesthesia (Massimini et al., 2012). However, even 
though information integration measures are already used in empirical studies of 
consciousness (e.g., Casali et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2009), it remains unclear how to assess the 
minimal degree of information integration required for consciousness to emerge. It is also 
unclear whether any integrated information, including artificially designed systems, would be 
conscious. Tononi (2007) seems to support the later conclusion, somewhat turning away from 
biological realism towards informational panpsychism (Chalmers, 1995) (see Sections 2.4.2 and 
2.4.3). 
After describing some of the most important concepts used in consciousness research, the 
fundamental properties of consciousness, the hard problem of consciousness-brain 
interaction, and how this problem is approached in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience, 
Section 3 following will focus on definitions and different types of ASCs. 
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3. ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
The stream of consciousness does not always flow continuously, and every now and then we 
may experience a significant alteration of consciousness, for example, when we meditate, or – 
in a less fortunate case – when we get sedated or anaesthetized due to a medical condition. 
Some of these alterations are subtle and hardly noticeable, whereas others are very obvious, 
such as a change of subjective experiences in the transition from waking to sleep, yielding 
hypnagogic hallucinations (Ohayon et al., 1996). What happens to the phenomenal contents of 
consciousness in these states? Do they provide unique experiences that are not available in 
the normal waking state of consciousness? How can we assess the contents of consciousness 
of another person undergoing an alteration of consciousness, for example, a hallucinating 
patient? Studying such alterations is important not only for the social or fundamental 
understanding of human consciousness, but also for their clinical relevance, as unusual 
subjective experiences might be psychologically disturbing and distressing (Delespaul et al., 
2002). 
3.1. Definitions and classifications 
During the last decades of research, a large number of diverse phenomena have been linked 
to or called altered states of consciousness (ASCs), including coma and vegetative state, 
daydreaming, drowsiness, epilepsy, extreme environmental conditions, hypnagogic states, 
hypnosis, meditation, near-death experiences, psychotic disorders, relaxation, respiratory 
manoeuvres, rhythm-induced trance, sensory deprivation, homogenization or overload, sexual 
activity and orgasm, sleep and dreaming, starvation and diet (Vaitl et al., 2005). This and 
similar lists of ASCs illustrate the complexity of the theoretical problem of trying to find 
unifying principles of all ASCs. Most of the definitions of ASCs focus on changes in subjective 
experiences and a subsequent reflection over these changes. For instance, Farthing (1992) 
defines an ASC as ‘a temporary change in the overall pattern of subjective experience, such 
that the individual believes that his or her mental functioning is distinctly different from 
certain general norms for his or her normal waking state of consciousness’ (p. 205) (see also 
Ludwig, 1966; Tart, 1972). The main problem with this group of definitions is that ‘altered’ is 
circularly defined as ‘a change’ and there are no formal criteria given to operationalize what 
degree of a change is needed for an ASC to be identified (Revonsuo et al., 2009). The 
requirement for self-awareness of a significant change of phenomenal consciousness does not 
hold for some of the classical ASCs, for example, a dreaming or a psychotic individual does not 
always realize that he or she is in an ASC. 
Instead of focusing on changes in phenomenal contents of consciousness, an alternative 
representational definition of ASC was recently developed by Revonsuo et al. (2009) who 
suggested that an ASC is ‘a state of the mechanisms of representation in the brain resulting in 
a global misrepresentational organization of the overall contents of consciousness at some 
moment in relation to the surrounding (‘‘world’’) context (in which they occur)’ (p. 195–196). 
This definition of an ASC focuses on changes in the preconscious or non-conscious background 
representational mechanisms of consciousness, which are more easily available for an 
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objective verification than internal subjective experiences. However, similarly to the 
phenomenal definition of an ASC, the representational definition does not seem to hold for all 
ASCs. For instance, neutral hypnosis, which has been suggested to be a powerful contrast 
condition for studying neural mechanisms of hypnosis (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003), does not 
seem to involve any observable representational changes. Furthermore, conceptually, 
misrepresentation cannot be attributed to an object or a process that does not aim to 
represent. For example, a drawing of Barack Obama will probably misrepresent the current 
President of the United States of America, however it is not meaningful to attribute a property 
of misrepresentation of George Bush to the same drawing as it was not intended to represent 
him. Likewise, the contents of dreaming during sleep may not misrepresent external physical 
environment simply because they are not aimed at representing it. 
Notably, it seems to be extremely difficult to grasp a common core of all ASCs in a single 
definition, as they might be both very similar and fundamentally different from each other 
depending on the comparison axis (Móró, 2010). Historically, naming different phenomena as 
ASCs was not theory-driven, but instead led by a general increased interest in the research of 
dreaming, meditation and LSD-induced alterations of consciousness in 1950s and 1960s 
(Metzner, 2010). The first operational definitions of an ASC were proposed when the concept 
of ASCs was already widely used (Krippner, 1972; Ludwig, 1966; Tart, 1972). A decade ago, 
instead of suggesting a single unifying definition of an ASC, a consortium of fifteen researchers 
working in the field took an alternative approach and suggested a unifying four-dimensional 
descriptive system under which all classical ASCs can be mapped (Vaitl et al., 2005). According 
to this proposal, consciousness can be altered across four dimensions: (1) activation or 
readiness to respond (aroused vs. relaxed); (2) awareness span or availability of experiences 
for attentional processing (wide vs. narrow); (3) self-awareness (present vs. absent); and (4) 
sensory dynamics (increased vs. decreased). For instance, typical dreaming can be 
characterized by relaxed activation, wide awareness span, present self-awareness and 
increased sensory dynamics (Vaitl et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, Vaitl et al. (2005) classified ASCs according to the methods of their induction, 
namely: (1) spontaneously occurring; (2) physically and physiologically induced; (3) 
psychologically induced; and (4) disease induced. This classification proved useful as it helps to 
find commonalities within a particular class of ASCs, for example, not only dreaming, but most 
of the spontaneously occurring ASCs can be characterized by relaxed activation, narrow 
awareness span, present self-awareness and increased sensory dynamics (Vaitl et al., 2005). 
However, the consortium members excluded pharmacologically induced alterations of 
consciousness, which form one of the largest classification groups of ASCs, including those 
induced by recreational drugs, psychoactive medical drugs, anaesthetic agents, and legal 
stimulants, such as caffeine and alcohol (Meyer & Quenzer, 2005). Furthermore, physically, 
physiologically and psychologically induced ASCs may not be that different, as they all share a 
cognitive decision and effort to reach an ASC. In this doctoral thesis, four categories of ASCs 
will be distinguished, refining the earlier classification by Vaitl et al. (2005): (1) naturally 
occurring; (2) cognitively induced; (3) pharmacologically induced; and (4) pathological 
alterations of consciousness. The concepts of an ASC and an alteration of consciousness will be 
used interchangeably as synonyms to refer to the historically named ASCs (Farthing, 1992). No 
priority will be given to either phenomenal or representational definitions of an ASC, as none 
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of them seem to include all relevant ASCs. Likewise, no single state will be regarded as the 
main baseline state for a contrast with an ASC. Even though a state of relaxed wakefulness 
may seem to be the most suitable baseline for an ASC (see Section 2.1.5), varying 
experimental paradigms of different alterations of consciousness may require choosing 
different states for a contrast with a particular ASC (see Section 4.1). 
3.2. Dreaming: a naturally occurring alteration of consciousness 
Natural alterations of consciousness take place in healthy individuals when unexpected or 
unusual intense perceptual, cognitive or emotional experiences occur spontaneously without 
any effort and, typically, without external physical stimulation. The most paradigmatic natural 
ASCs are nocturnal dreaming and a large group of other sleep-related alterations, including 
hypnogogic and hypnopompic hallucinations, sleep mentation, nightmares, lucid dreams, 
sleep paralysis and night terrors (Farthing, 1992; Hobson, 2001; Vaitl et al., 2005). Dreaming 
can be defined as the presence of ‘complex, multimodal, dynamic and progressive conscious 
experiences during sleep that are organized in the form of sensory-perceptual world or a 
world simulation’ (Revonsuo, 2009, p. 295). The definition emphasizes the spatial integration 
of multimodal perceptual experiences into a coherent world model and the temporal 
development of these experiences. However, not all perceptual experiences are dynamic 
during sleep, and minimal forms of dreaming exist with spatially complex but temporally static 
contents of consciousness (Study II, see Section 6.3), demonstrating an alteration of 
fundamental temporal properties of consciousness (Noreika et al., 2010c). Other perceptually 
relatively simple sleep-related ASCs are hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations: sensory 
experiences occurring at the transition from wake to sleep, or from sleep to wake (Ohayon et 
al., 1996). While due to the suppression of reflective consciousness we are not typically aware 
of the fact we are dreaming, reflective consciousness is present during lucid dreaming in which 
the dreamer knows that he or she is dreaming (Farthing, 1992). Different types of dream 
lucidity will be investigated in Study VI (see Section 6.7). 
Despite a close phenomenological resemblance of dreaming and waking experiences 
(Revonsuo, 2006), they are extremely different when it comes to their immediate sources: 
dream experiences are internally simulated, whereas waking experiences are largely driven by 
the prediction of external stimuli (Hobson & Friston, 2012). In addition, the dreaming mind has 
a number of cognitive deficiencies, such as the lack of metacognition (Windt & Metzinger, 
2007), as well as unusually high incidence of negative emotions when compared to the waking 
life (Nielsen et al., 1991). Perhaps the most striking aspect of dreaming is the frequent 
bizarreness of its phenomenal contents (Hobson, 1988). Bizarreness can be defined as ‘places, 
objects, persons, and other dream contents that deviate in peculiar ways from their 
counterparts in waking life, or show unusual combinations of phenomenal features’ 
(Revonsuo, 2006, p. 240). Three different types of dream bizarreness are often distinguished: 
incongruity, uncertainty, and discontinuity (Hobson, 1988; Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995; see 
also Study III, Section 6.4). Incongruity refers to the mismatching features of dream contents, 
uncertainty points to the explicit vagueness of dream contents, whereas discontinuity refers to 
the abrupt change of identity, time, and place of other phenomenal contents of dreaming 
(Hobson, 1988). Different types of bizarreness are not uniformly distributed across different 
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contents of dreaming, but instead they show a pattern of bizarreness-clustering, for example, 
the most incongruous are language and cognition-related dream contents, whereas the least 
incongruous is the dream Self (Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995). Revonsuo and Tarkko (2002) 
argued that dream bizarreness is a result of different types of binding errors occurring during 
sleep, indicating a breakdown of the fundamental properties of consciousness (see Section 
2.2) and providing an important database for studying the unity of consciousness (Revonsuo, 
1995b). 
Given the broad complexity of dream experiences, a very large number of dream content 
analysis scales have been developed (Winget & Kramer, 1979), measuring selected aspects of 
phenomenal contents of consciousness, the most notable of which is the Hall and Van de 
Castle Scale for the Content Analysis of Dreams (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966). In addition to the 
content analyses of dream reports (for more details, see Section 4.2), an increasing number of 
studies aim to bridge from the dream phenomenology to the underlying sleep 
neurophysiology (Nir & Tononi, 2010). While the early attempt to establish a necessary and 
sufficient link between dreaming and physiology of REM sleep (Aserinsky & Kleitman, 1953) 
have largely failed, as up to 40% of NREM sleep awakenings yield dream reports (Nielsen, 
2000), some of the recent studies have aimed to identify the neural mechanisms of particular 
contents of dreaming. For instance, analysis of diffusion tensor imaging has recently linked the 
trait of high dream bizarreness with the relatively low volume of left amygdala, whose 
decreased microstructural integrity was also associated with the lower emotional load of 
dream reports (De Gennaro et al., 2011). In another recent study, dream lucidity was found to 
be associated with the specific high-frequency EEG patterns in the frontal sensors (Voss et al., 
2009). For a proposal of a novel brain stimulation paradigm to study neural mechanisms of 
lucid dreaming, see Study VI (Section 6.7). 
3.3. Hypnosis: a cognitively induced alteration of consciousness 
ASCs may occur in response to deliberate cognitive and/or behavioural efforts, when a 
repetitive action, thought or attention concentration leads to alterations of subjective 
experiences and the underlying representational and neural processes. The most known 
cognitively induced alterations of consciousness are meditation and hypnosis, the first of which 
can be achieved by meditators themselves, while the second typically requires an interaction 
between a hypnotist and a hypnosis participant. Typically, a hypnosis session consists of the 
induction and suggestion phases (Farthing, 1992). During induction, a hypnotist guides an 
individual participant or a group of participants through a set of relaxation commands. 
Afterwards, when a participant becomes deeply relaxed, a hypnotist may give ideomotor, 
response-inhibition and/or cognitive suggestions (Hilgard, 1965), the choice of which will 
depend on a particular clinical or experimental purpose of the hypnosis session. Receptivity of 
hypnotic suggestions is highly variable across individuals, and various hypnotizability scales, 
such as the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale: Form C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962), are 
used to identify individuals with low, medium or high hypnotic susceptibility. Distinctions 
between hypnotizability categories are based on the count of individual’s positive responses 
to the standardized suggestions, such as ‘you are now beginning to have a sour taste in your 
mouth’ (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). 
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Interestingly, hypnosis is a rather passive state of the mind and if left unguided by a 
hypnotist, individuals under hypnosis would not necessarily detect any obvious alterations of 
consciousness. Yet, when suggested, highly susceptible individuals may experience intense 
perceptual changes, such as positive and negative visual hallucinations (Spiegel, 2003), or even 
more complex hypnotic dreams (Raz et al., 2009). Regarding cognitive changes under 
hypnosis, a well-replicated finding is a facilitation of selective attention (Raz, 2005), which may 
even lead to the cessation of the Stroop effect (Raz et al., 2002). In a state of neutral hypnosis, 
i.e., when no specific post-induction suggestions are given, a common finding is an 
underestimation of time (Naish, 2007), suggesting that hypnosis distorts temporal processing 
of the brain/mind. 
Hypnosis itself can be defined procedurally, i.e., by referring to the hypnotic techniques 
and situational conditions controlled by the hypnotist, or phenomenologically, i.e., by pointing 
out cognitive and perceptual alterations experienced under hypnosis. Following the 
procedural approach, the Division of Psychological Hypnosis of the American Psychological 
Association defines hypnosis as a procedure during which ‘one person (the subject) is guided 
by another (the hypnotist) to respond to suggestions for changes in subjective experience, 
alterations in perception, sensation, emotion, thought or behavior’ (Green et al., 2005, p. 262). 
Notably, such procedural definitions do not require an alteration of consciousness to occur, 
but instead a very specific suggestive social interaction itself is regarded as sufficient evidence 
for the presence of hypnosis. As an alternative to the procedural definitions that largely ignore 
the subjective experiences of a hypnotized participant, phenomenological definitions 
emphasize ‘the hypnotic state or changes in the subject’s consciousness and scope of 
attention caused by suggestions given by another person’ (Revonsuo, 2009, p. 297). According 
to phenomenological definitions, application of hypnotic induction and suggestions without 
concurrent changes in consciousness would indicate the failure rather than the presence of 
hypnosis. Different emphases of procedural and phenomenological definitions are not minor 
conceptual disagreements between hypnosis researchers, but instead they stem from the 
major ‘state vs. non-state’ controversy regarding the ontological status of hypnosis. So called 
non-state  socio-cognitive theories of hypnosis argue that hypnosis is a special type of social 
interaction between two people, one of whom obeys and follows suggestions and commands 
given by another person: despite a seemingly odd behaviour, hypnotized individuals do not 
undergo any substantial alterations of consciousness, but instead their behaviour and 
cognition can be explained by standard psychological principles of compliance to the social 
and contextual demands, expectation fulfillment, cognitive dissociation and mental imagery 
(Kirsch & Lynn, 1998; Spanos & Coe, 1992; Wagstaff, 1981). By contrast, proponents of the 
state theories of hypnosis argue that hypnotized individuals undergo alterations of the mind 
and brain, which cannot be reduced to typical flexibility of the mental and neural functions 
(Gruzelier, 1998, 2005). For instance, hypnotic suggestion to perceive colours in a gray-scale 
stimulus is followed by subjective colour reports as well as increase of the neural activation in 
the extrastriate visual cortices (Kosslyn et al., 2000; Mazzoni et al., 2009; but see Mazzoni et 
al., 2013). 
To reconcile solid evidence in support of both state and non-state theories of hypnosis, 
Kallio and Revonsuo (2003, 2005) proposed that two different phenomena are conflated under 
the same term of hypnosis. While most of the hypnotic occurrences, especially those observed 
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in low and medium hypnotic susceptibility groups, can be explained by reference to the typical 
socio-cognitive processes, a genuine hypnotic ASC may take place in highly susceptible 
individuals. Arguably, hypnotic state occurs only in so called hypnotic virtuosos, who show all 
classical features of hypnotic trance and do not require prolonged hypnotic induction to reach 
it. If so, case studies of such individuals may be the most sensitive research program aiming to 
reveal the neurocognitive mechanisms of hypnotic ASC (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003). Following 
this programmatic suggestion, an extensive research of eye movements of a hypnotic virtuoso 
T.S.-H. recently showed that ‘trance stare’, a classical feature of deep hypnosis, is associated 
with large changes in the optokinetic and pupillary reflexes and saccade programming, which 
cannot be imitated voluntarily (Kallio et al., 2011), supporting the state theory of hypnosis. 
Temporal processing in T.S.-H. will be investigated in Study VII (see Section 6.8). 
3.4. Sedation: a pharmacologically induced alteration of consciousness 
Pharmacologically induced alterations of consciousness occur in response to the intake of 
psychoactive substances, the most common of which are caffeine, nicotine, and alcohol. 
Caffeine is known to trigger energetic arousal (Smit & Rogers, 2000), whereas nicotine tends 
to have a tranquilizing effect (Gilbert, 1979). High doses of alcohol may induce cognitive and 
perceptual alterations, such as a decline of logical reasoning (Williamson et al., 2001) or 
reduced sensitivity in recognizing social cues of sexual interest (Farris et al., 2010). Much more 
complex and intense perceptual alterations occur in response to hallucinogens, such as LSD, 
psilocybin, mescaline or salvia divinorum, when they are used with open expectations (‘mental 
set’) in the appropriate environment (‘setting’) (Faillace & Szara, 1968). For instance, unusual 
visual experiences, such as visual trails – a series of afterimages following a moving object 
(Dubois & VanRullen, 2011) – may occur after the LSD intake, whereas salvia divinorum often 
induces the experience of derealisation, i.e., sensation of entering another reality (González et 
al., 2006). LSD-induced modulation of time perception, which is another common 
pharmacological alteration of the contents of consciousness, will be reviewed in Study VIII (see 
Section 6.9). 
One of the most extreme pharmacological disruptions of the stream of consciousness 
occurs under the effect of general anaesthetic when an anaesthetized patient loses awareness 
(Alkire et al., 2008; Mashour, 2010). General anaesthesia can be defined either by its clinical 
effects or by the clinical procedures, in particular by its induction and maintenance techniques 
(Urban & Bleckwenn, 2002). Interestingly, a parallel can be drawn between different types of 
definitions of general anaesthesia and hypnosis. Both of these ASCs can be defined either by 
reference to their procedures or by reference to the cognitive and behavioural state of an 
individual under effect. Typically, definition by the clinical effects regards immobility, 
analgesia, unconsciousness, and amnesia as the key features of general anaesthesia (Antognini 
& Carstens, 2002; Heinke & Schwarzbauer, 2002; Urban & Bleckwenn, 2002). Antognini and 
Carstens (2002) described a gradual model of general anaesthesia in which different clinical 
effects are achieved at different time points during administration of the increasing 
anaesthetic dosage. A relatively low anaesthetic dosage supresses recall of intraoperative 
experiences, a higher concentration induces unconsciousness, and further increase in the 
dosage leads to the complete immobility. 
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Rather shockingly, administration of anaesthetic agents does not always result in the 
complete loss of subjective experiences, leading to various anaesthetic-induced alterations of 
consciousness. Most notably, intraoperative anaesthesia awareness occurs when a patient 
under general anaesthesia maintains or regains awareness of being operated on (Bergman et 
al., 2002; Mashour et al., 2012; Sebel et al., 2004). Somewhat relieving is a finding that many 
of the anaesthesia awareness occurrences do not involve full consciousness. Instead, only 
some aspects of perception or cognition are typically regained, such as hearing talking 
throughout the procedure or feeling intubation (Bergman et al., 2002). Likewise, even though 
most of awareness patients experience anxiety, sensation of pain does not always take place 
(Lennmarken et al., 2002). While anaesthesia awareness is a relatively rare phenomenon 
estimated to occur in about 0.1% of general anaesthesia cases (Mashour et al., 2012; Sebel et 
al., 2004), a much more common anaesthetic-induced alteration of consciousness is 
anaesthesia dreaming, with incidence ranging from 4% (Leslie et al. 2005) to 53% (Errando et 
al., 2008) of patients undergoing general anaesthesia. Anaesthesia dreaming is often defined 
as ‘any experience that a patient is able to recall postoperatively that he or she thinks is 
dreaming and which he or she thinks occurred between the induction of anesthesia and the 
first moment of consciousness after anesthesia’ (Leslie, 2010, p. 75). While being sufficient in 
the clinical context, the reliance of this definition on the explicit recall of a dream excludes a 
scientifically interesting possibility that unrecalled subjective experiences may exist during 
general anaesthesia. Arguably, most of the anaesthesia-related alterations of consciousness 
occur at the relatively low dosage of anaesthetic agents in a state of sedation, in which the use 
of medical agents leads to the reduced level of consciousness (Morita et al., 2002), but the 
individual still maintains a capacity of residual consciousness. Complexity of subjective 
experiences in a state of anaesthetic-induced sedation will be analysed in Study I (see Section 
6.2). 
3.5. Psychosis: a pathological alteration of consciousness 
While most of the naturally occurring, as well as cognitively- or pharmacologically- induced, 
ASCs can be experienced by any interested healthy individual, psychiatric or neurological 
patients may undergo disorder-related alterations of subjective experiences, for example, 
waking visual hallucinations in bipolar disorder (Baethge et al., 2005), or perceptual distortions 
during partial epileptic seizures (Johanson et al., 2008). Most of the pathological states of 
consciousness persist for relatively long periods of time, yet some of the alterations are 
relatively short-lasting, for example, visual migraine aura typically continues from 5 to 60 
minutes (Viana et al., 2013). Notably, even though the extreme cases of pathological 
alterations of consciousness seem very odd, for example, bizarre delusions (Cermolacce et al., 
2010), there is sometimes no clear-cut line separating pathological and normal experiences. 
For instance, there seems to be a continuum of paranoid thinking from occasional ungrounded 
suspicions in healthy individuals to fixed delusions in psychotic patients (Freeman et al., 2010, 
2011). 
Particularly intense and complex alterations of consciousness occur in psychosis, which can 
be broadly defined as the pathological presence of hallucinations and delusions (Bentall, 
2007). Given that psychosis itself is not a categorized disorder but rather a set of symptoms 
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observed in different psychiatric disorders, the more precise definitions of psychosis are 
disorder-specific. Thus, for example, in schizophrenia ‘the term psychotic refers to delusions, 
any prominent hallucinations, disorganized speech, or disorganized or catatonic behavior’ 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 297), whereas in substance-induced psychotic 
disorder ‘psychotic refers to delusions or only those hallucinations that are not accompanied 
by insight’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 298). In schizophrenia, psychotic 
episodes are associated with intense changes in perception, cognition and/or emotions. 
Perhaps the most distinct perceptual disturbances in schizophrenia are auditory and verbal 
hallucinations (‘voices’) (Johns & McGuire, 1999), which are likely caused by abnormal 
activation levels of the auditory cortex and Broca’s area (Kühn & Gallinat, 2012). However, 
visual (David et al., 2011) and olfactory (Arguedas et al., 2012) hallucinations may also be 
experienced by psychotic schizophrenic patients. Regarding reflective consciousness, psychosis 
in schizophrenia is often marked by reasoning abnormalities and complex delusions, i.e., false 
beliefs (Langdon et al., 2010). Emotional changes in schizophrenia can range from emotional 
withdrawal (Kay et al., 1987) to high levels of agitation (Marco & Vaughan, 2005). While 
schizophrenia can affect very broad aspects of phenomenal and reflective consciousness, 
some other psychiatric disorders primarily affect only a particular dimension of consciousness, 
for example, emotional alterations dominate in affective disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). 
Importantly, psychiatric or neurological disorders may be associated with changes not only 
in the baseline waking state, but also in the ‘normal’ ASCs, for example, psychotic patients 
with daytime delusions have an increased frequency of grandiosity topics in their dreams 
(D’Agostino et al., 2013). In this case, a paradoxical ‘alteration of alteration’ is encountered: 
patients’ dreams may be different from dreams of healthy individuals, whose dreams in turn 
are different from their waking mentation. Possible alterations in the bizarreness of dreaming 
in psychotic schizophrenia patients will be investigated in Study III (see Section 6.4). 
3.6. Unconscious states of mind 
As discussed earlier, an unconscious state of mind contains no qualia, but maintains a potential 
to become conscious (see Section 2.1.6), which may provide important contrast conditions for 
studying the neural mechanisms of consciousness. A reversible unconsciousness may be a 
result of various neurological disorders, for example, a complete loss of consciousness is very 
typical but not always present after complex partial seizures in epilepsy patients (Johanson et 
al., 2003). Yet, perhaps the most common unconscious states are dreamless sleep, which will 
be investigated in Study II (see Section 6.3), and general anaesthesia or sedation, which will be 
explored in Study I (see Section 6.2). The loss of conscious experiences during dreamless sleep 
(Gillespie, 2002; Tononi & Massimini, 2008) is the only naturally occurring reversible fading of 
the stream of consciousness. The depth of sleep is typically assessed by visual scoring of 
polysomnographic (PSG) measurements, in particular EEG, electrooculography (EOG) and 
electromyography (EMG) activity patterns (Iber et al., 2007). Consciousness is often regarded 
to be lost when sleep EEG is dominated by the low frequency EEG delta activity (0.5–3 Hz). 
During deep NREM sleep, only a limited degree of integrated information is maintained in the 
cortex, which may prevent conscious experiences to emerge (Tononi, 2009). Up to 20% of 
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sleep laboratory participants never report subjective experiences after awakenings from slow 
wave NREM sleep, and a further 30% of participants are very unlikely to report dreaming or 
mentation after awakenings from these stages of sleep (Cavallero et al., 1992). 
Similarly to NREM sleep, deep anaesthesia is also associated with decreased high 
frequency activity (Tonner & Bein, 2006); however, this pattern is not universal and, for 
example, S-ketamine anaesthesia has increased spectral power in high rather than low 
frequencies (Maksimow et al., 2006). To monitor the depth of anaesthesia and sedation, 
various complex EEG-based indexes have been developed, the most commonly used of which 
is the bispectral (BIS) index. The BIS index is a non-linear combination of four different 
measures: the relative spectral power of the beta and gamma frequency range; the bispectral 
component of the broad frequency range; the ‘QUAZI’ suppression component; and the ‘burst 
suppression’ measure (Schneider, 2010). The BIS values from 100 to 80 indicate an awake 
state, 80 to 60 – sedation, 60 to 40 – anaesthesia, 40 to 20 – deep anaesthesia, and 20 to 0 – 
EEG burst suppression (Schneider, 2010). Generally, the lower the BIS index values are, the 
less likely it is that the patient is conscious (Kearse et al., 1998); however, intraoperative 
awareness may occur even when this BIS index is below the recommended value of 60 (Avidan 
et al., 2008). A further theoretical complication of the status of unconscious states arises from 
a possibility that the stream of consciousness may never be interrupted during deep sleep or 
general anaesthesia, for example, we may always dream in unresponsive states such as NREM 
sleep, but may not be able to recall it (Schredl et al., 2013). If so, the absence of reported 
subjective experiences may indicate a failure of memory rather than the absence of conscious 
experiences. Currently, there are no available empirical methods to confirm or exclude such 
possibilities. 
3.7. Interactions between different alterations of consciousness 
Even though each of the reviewed ASCs could be defined as a distinctive combination of the 
induction techniques and consequent alterations in perception, cognition, emotions and the 
underlying representational and neurobiological processes, some of the alterations seem to be 
phenomenologically analogous and perhaps may even share some of the neurocognitive 
mechanisms. For instance, Schwartz and Maquet (2002) pointed out that bizarre dreaming 
reminds many of the neuropsychological syndromes, such as misidentification of faces (Frégoli 
syndrome), places (reduplicative paramnesia), or loss of colour saturation (achromatopsia), 
suggesting that natural alterations of consciousness may temporarily replicate more persistent 
pathological ASCs. Lynn et al. (2012) argued that the depth of two major cognitively induced 
ASCs – hypnosis and meditation – could be modified by similar imaginative suggestions, and 
that both of these states could be successfully applied to train attention processing. Individual 
hypnotizability was also linked to habitual daytime sleepiness (Móró et al., 2011), showing that 
susceptibility to a cognitively induced ASC can be related to a trait of transition to a natural 
alteration of consciousness within the wake/sleep cycle. 
Despite a number of somewhat sporadic comparisons (e.g., Lynn et al., 2012; Móró et al., 
2011; Schwartz & Maquet, 2002) and several more systematic attempts to relate various 
alterations of consciousness (Hobson et al., 2000; Vaitl et al., 2005), contrastive analyses of 
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different ASCs are still in a very premature state. Likewise, methods developed to study one of 
the alterations, for example, content analysis of subjective dream reports (Winget & Kramer, 
1979), are seldom applied to study other states of consciousness. As encouraging exceptions, 
the content analysis methods are sometimes applied to study subjective reports of partial 
epileptic seizures (Johanson et al., 2008) and auditory hallucinations (Kent & Wahass, 1996) 
(for the content analysis of anaesthetic-induced experiences, see Study I, Section 6.2). 
Arguably, the major reason for this somewhat surprising neglect lies in methodological 
difficulties of finding suitable tools and experimental manipulations for systematic 
comparisons, either between a selected alteration of consciousness and a baseline state of 
consciousness, or between different ASCs. Most of the theoretical advancements in this thesis 
will be directed to the search for systematic associations between different states of 
consciousness (Studies IV, V, VIII, see Sections 6.5, 6.6, 6.9). Methodological limitations and 
possible solutions for studying ASCs are discussed in the following section. 
Empirical Methods of Studying Altered States of Consciousness 41 
4. EMPIRICAL METHODS OF STUDYING ALTERED STATES OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
Experimental research of consciousness is limited by the asymmetry of access to subjective 
experiences (Velmans, 2007): while the empirical sciences of consciousness seek explanation 
of the mechanisms of consciousness from the objective third-person perspective, the 
experiencing subjects as participants of experimental studies can report the contents of their 
consciousness only from the subjective first-person perspective (Nagel, 1974). Given that the 
first-person data are not directly accessible by the third-person scientific methods, the 
asymmetry of access leads to a number of methodological obstacles that are specific to 
consciousness studies. 
4.1. Facing the obstacles: introspection, reportability, baseline, and sampling 
As long as the necessary and sufficient neural correlate of the phenomenal consciousness is 
unknown, the presence and the contents of subjective experiences in another person can only 
be reliably confirmed through a subjective report of a conscious agent, for example, by a 
button press (Salminen-Vaparanta et al., 2012), an eye blink (Marcel, 1993), a verbal answer 
(Schredl et al., 2009), or an act of mental imagery (Cruse et al., 2011). The most novel fMRI 
analysis methods can decode hemodynamic representations of visual experiences not only 
during waking but also during sleep onset, yet such experimental designs still rely on 
participants’ confirmatory verbal reports (Horikawa et al., 2013). Naturally, progress of 
consciousness research largely depends on the accuracy of participants’ introspection, i.e., 
‘thinking about one’s primary conscious experiences […] for the purpose of describing and 
interpreting them’ (Farthing, 1992, p. 58). Given that introspection depends on memory 
(James, 1890), it can be called a retrospection, i.e., thinking about remembered past 
experiences (Farthing, 1992), a paradigmatic example of which is a post-awakening reporting 
of dream experiences. 
Introspecting participants are expected to be cooperative and trustworthy, i.e., they should 
not censor or confabulate their reports (Farthing, 1992), which is very complicated to control. 
These methodological constraints, i.e., reportability of the contents of consciousness and 
cooperativeness of the conscious agent, are particularly challenging when studying ASCs. For 
instance, reportability might be severely impaired due to limited meta-consciousness, i.e., 
explicit re-representation of the contents of consciousness (Schooler, 2002). In particular, 
hallucinating individuals might be so absorbed by unusual experiences that little resources are 
left to reflect on and verbalize their perceptual or cognitive experiences. Likewise, individuals 
experiencing alterations of consciousness may not be as cooperative and willing to report as 
they would be in a normal baseline state of consciousness, a paradigmatic example of which is 
the lack of cooperativeness of a depressed patient (Goekoop et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, reportability might be completely lacking in unresponsive alterations of 
consciousness, such as sleep. In cases when an agent is unable or unwilling to report their 
experiences, a conscious person might be misjudged as unconscious (Mashour & LaRock, 2008), 
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as unreportable or unreported mental processes might still be subjective, although unavailable 
for further cognitive and behavioural processing. In addition to sleep, other paradigmatic 
alterations with a possible dissociation between (un)responsiveness and (un)consciousness are 
general anaesthesia and vegetative or minimally conscious state (Boly et al., 2013). 
Unfortunately, given the methodological limitations of reportability and cooperativeness, there 
are very few studies that have systematically assessed the presence of subjective experiences in 
a well-controlled unresponsive state of the brain (but see Study I, Section 6.2). 
Uncertain status of a baseline state of consciousness is yet another major obstacle that 
complicates research of the perceptual, cognitive and neural mechanisms of ASCs. 
Metaphorically, an alteration of consciousness could be defined as a significant diversion from 
the mainstream of consciousness, i.e., from a normal state of a healthy waking mind (see 
Sections 2.1.5 and 3.1). Yet, the choice of the normal baseline state against which an altered 
state should be identified and studied is uncertain, as there are no widely established settings 
(such as time of the day, body position, experimental task, etc.) under which the baseline state 
should be assessed. Consequently, it remains uncertain how strong the deviation of subjective 
experiences should be in order to be identified as an alteration of consciousness, for example, 
it is debatable whether diurnal fluctuations of perception (Alfuth & Rosenbaum, 2011), 
cognition (Marek et al., 2010), or emotions (Clark et al., 1989) would count as naturally 
occurring alterations of consciousness. 
A further methodological complication arises when a contrast between a baseline waking 
state and an ASC is not feasible due to unresponsiveness of research participant. For instance, 
while the same time perception task could be carried out in hypnosis and in baseline waking 
state (Naish, 2001), it could not be performed by dreaming participants, unless they would 
become lucid (Erlacher & Schredl, 2004). In such cases, a different type of alteration could be 
used as a baseline contrast condition, for example, EEG studies aiming to find 
electrophysiological correlates of dreaming have tried to compare different sleep stages 
(Corsi-Cabrera et al., 2003), dreaming vs. dreamless sleep (Esposito et al., 2004), or to contrast 
different types of dreams (Nielsen & Chénier, 1999). Comparison of dreaming and dreamless 
sleep enables a sharp contrast between the presence and the absence of consciousness itself 
or its recall, as dreamless sleep might contain forgotten dreaming, as argued by Schredl et al. 
(2013). A contrast of dreams with varying frequency of selected experiences highlights a 
possibility of studying gradual transitions between different alterations of consciousness. 
The major practical limitation of studying ASCs is inefficient data collection. Some of the 
ASC occur so seldom, for example, lucid dreaming, that it is almost impossible to study them 
experimentally, in which case studying a single well-trained participant might be an optimal 
choice (for a hypnotic virtuoso’s case study, see Study VII, Section 6.8). While other natural 
ASCs, such as REM sleep dreaming, may occur much more frequently, perhaps each night, only 
four or five measurements are usually possible during one night. Study II aimed to improve the 
efficiency of laboratory research of dreaming by introducing a serial awakenings paradigm (see 
Section 6.3). Finally, in addition to practical limitations, there are certain ethical restrictions to 
study some of the pharmacologically induced or pathological ASCs, as, for instance, research 
participants may not always have a cognitive and/or behavioural capacity to consent their 
participation or to withdraw from the study if they would wish so. 
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4.2. Content analysis of subjective reports 
In laboratory research of dreaming, the reportability constraint is addressed by collecting 
subjective reports after participants are awakened (e.g., Schredl et al., 2009). Typically, verbal 
dream reports are audio-recorded and later transcribed for the content analysis of written 
texts, during which a rater identifies and classifies specific contents of dreaming, such as a 
number of live characters, or rates more complex features of dreaming, such bizarreness or 
lucidity. This way, subjective experiences within an ASC are evaluated outside of the alteration 
itself. Obviously, this approach has a number of introspection-related limitations, including 
forgetting, reconstruction errors, verbal description difficulties, censorship of intimate 
experiences, and lack of independent verification (Farthing, 1992), as well as errors made by 
the experimenter performing content analysis. While all of these limitations are 
methodologically challenging to deal with, the memory confound is particularly problematic in 
dream research, as sleepy participants may forget or censor certain dream experiences, or 
they may not even recall the presence of dreaming itself. Thus, a participant could report a 
state of dreamless sleep when in fact there was an intense, but forgotten, dream. Feasibility of 
such cases is supported by frequent occurrence of white dreaming, a state when an awakened 
person has a strong feeling that he or she was dreaming but does not recall any specific 
experience from the dream, which may happen in about 40% of awakenings from the early 
night stages 2 and 3 of NREM sleep (Study II, see Section 6.3). Hurlburt and Heavy (2004) 
described a number of methods that may improve the accuracy of reports of beep-interrupted 
waking mentation, for example, the beep should come from the participant’s own natural 
environment. Similarly, awakening process should be well-controlled in dream research, as 
gradual awakenings from sleep result in higher rate of thought-like reports than do abrupt 
awakenings (Shapiro et al., 1963). Also, participants should be instructed to restrain their body 
movements after awakening, as motor activity can interfere with dream recall (Calkins, 1893). 
In order to minimize content analysis errors, quantitative analyses are often carried out by 
several blind judges aiming at a strong inter-judge agreement (>75%), this way reducing 
possible bias in identification and classification of subjective experiences (e.g., Valli et al., 
2005). Reliability assessment is particularly important when new content analysis scales or 
systems are devised (such as in Studies I, II, see Sections 6.2, 6.3). In addition to the reliability 
of dream content analysis, the validity of measurement should be assessed when possible 
(Kramer, 2007). Ideally, a dream scale should be content-valid, i.e., appropriate to the concept 
being measured. Further, a scale should show construct validity, i.e., it should be measuring 
the right construct and its different items should be related around the same construct or 
constructs. Finally, a valid dream scale should show predictive validity, i.e., it should be 
sensitive to detect the predicted research outcomes or hypothesized group differences. 
Unfortunately, formal psychometric analyses of dream content scales are seldom carried out 
(for a recent attempt, see Stumbrys et al., 2013). Given that neither experimenters nor 
awakened research participants have direct access to dream experiences, assessment of the 
content and construct validity of dream scales must rely on the poor memory and limited 
verbal reports of unique dreams. Unfortunately, well-controlled, repeated measurements are 
impossible in dream research, for instance, while doubtful measurements of hypnotic 
susceptibility could be repeated with the same individual on another day, sleep researchers do 
not have a privilege to ask their participants to undergo the same dream one more time. Thus, 
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there is no direct way to check if the scale showing only negative emotions may have missed 
the positive ones that were experienced but forgotten. 
Stability of dream content analysis is also inflated by a large intra-individual variability of 
dream characteristics, such as bizarreness and emotional tone (Schredl et al., 2001). It is 
recommended that at least 20 dream reports per individual should be collected in a short 
period of time in order to obtain reliable measures of dream content (Schredl et al., 2001), yet 
it is not always feasible in time-consuming laboratory studies of dreaming (efficiency of 
laboratory collection of dream reports will be addressed in Study II, see Section 6.3). If 
possible, highly motivated and introspective participants should be recruited for the 
laboratory studies of dreaming, as higher recall is associated with an individual’s positive 
attitude towards dreams (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2007). In addition, dream recall can be 
increased through training to pay attention to dreams, especially for the low and medium 
dream recallers (Schredl, 2002; Schredl & Doll, 1997). 
Despite the suggested methodological improvements, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
dream research remains dependent on the limitations of subjective introspective reports. Two 
alternatives exist here: a simple sceptical solution would be to regard dream research as a 
non-scientific enterprise (e.g., Malcolm, 1959), yet this position ignores certain empirical facts 
about the world, i.e., the subjective reality of our dream experiences. Further, given that 
behaviouristic scepticism regards dreams as unsuitable objects for the science of empirical 
facts, a natural deduction from this position would be that dream experiences are not, or do 
not, depend on empirical, i.e., neurobiological, processes, which is not compatible with 
biological approaches that treat consciousness as an empirically and causally real 
phenomenon. Instead, a psychobiologically more plausible approach would be to continue 
developing introspection methods, aiming at as controlled and robust experimental designs as 
possible. Conscious states derived from introspective reports are often good predictors of 
human behaviours (Wilson, 2003), and as such they do generate descriptive categories that 
can be used in scientific hypotheses and theories. In fact, research using content analysis of 
dream reports has already yielded a number of well-replicated interesting findings (Barrett & 
McNamara, 2007), and other sciences that have to deal with subjective experiences may 
benefit from the adaptation of dream research methods. For instance, studies of anaesthesia 
dreaming typically evaluate only the presence or absence of subjective experiences without 
analysing further the contents of phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Leslie et al., 2009). 
Arguably, research of consciousness alteration during sedation and anaesthesia would benefit 
a lot from the application of dream analysis methods (as was done in Study I, see Section 6.2). 
4.3. Behavioural methods to study alterations of consciousness 
Instead of collecting and analysing verbal introspective reports, consciousness can be 
investigated by behavioural methods, for example, by analysing participants‘ responses in 
stimuli detection or discrimination experiments (Braun & Julesz, 1998; Fisk & Haase, 2005). In 
a typical behavioural experiment of the contents of consciousness, physical stimuli are 
presented at the threshold level of awareness, and participants are asked to report if they 
perceived the stimulus or not (detection tasks), or alternatively, which of the several possible 
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stimuli did they experience (discrimination tasks). By systematically manipulating physical 
properties of stimuli, for example, the duration of targets (Pessoa et al., 2005), and/or 
cognitive functions, such as expectancy and attention (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007), and 
analysing how these manipulations are reflected in behavioural measures of awareness, a 
large range of questions can be investigated, such as: what is the temporal order of awareness 
of different visual features (Zeki & Bartels, 1999); is awareness necessary for top-down 
attention and working memory (Hsieh & Colas, 2012); how does preceding unconscious or 
non-conscious processing modulate subsequent conscious awareness (Peremen et al., 2013); 
and is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous (Overgaard et al., 2006; Sergent & 
Dehaene, 2004). The presence of specific contents of consciousness is typically assessed by the 
dichotomous ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses, for example, by measuring the hit rate in a certain 
condition or calculating more complex signal detection measures, such as discriminability and 
response criterion (Ricci & Chatterjee, 2004). In addition to dichotomous responses, other 
behavioural measures can also be used to assess the consciousness, including reaction times 
(Kentridge et al., 2008) or, for instance, a temporal rate of perceptual reversals in response to 
the presentation of ambiguous figures (Intaitė et al., 2013). Further, several awareness-
specific behavioural measures may be used to assess phenomenal consciousness more 
accurately, such as confidence ratings of target visibility, which enables more differentiated 
analysis of subjective experiences, for example, visual awareness of stimulus presence can be 
compared with more complex awareness of stimulus type (Salminen-Vaparanta et al., 2012). 
Similarly to the experiments of the contents of consciousness in a typical waking state, 
behavioural measures can be applied to study ASCs. For instance, individuals can perform the 
same cognitive task in a baseline state and an ASC or in several different ASCs, which would 
allow a contrast of cognitive processes in different states of consciousness with phenomenal 
contents being relatively well-controlled and largely driven by experimental stimuli (for such a 
contrast between time perception in hypnosis and baseline waking state, see Study VII, see 
Section 6.8). However, even though paradigms using behavioural methods have much higher 
control of the phenomenal contents of consciousness than experiments relying on the content 
analysis methods (see Section 4.2), they still largely rely on the accuracy of participants’ 
introspection. In dream research, participants introspect their subjective experiences and then 
give a verbal report, whereas in behavioural studies they have to report their introspection by 
a motor response, unless it is a speeded reaction times task. Notably, analysis of verbal reports 
enables multidimensional measurement of relatively complex subjective experiences, whereas 
behavioural methods typically focus on a very narrow aspect of phenomenal or access 
consciousness, ignoring the broader spatial and temporal unity of consciousness (see Section 
2.2). However, behavioural methods allow rapid sampling of the same type of subjective 
experiences, and provide tools for studying interaction between consciousness and other 
mental functions. Thus, more powerful cognitive and statistical analyses are possible in 
behavioural studies than those available for the content analysis studies. 
4.4. Neuroimaging of altered states of consciousness 
The two major approaches to study the neural mechanisms of consciousness include 
experimental designs focusing on the selected contents of consciousness, and paradigms 
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designed to study the overall states of consciousness (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Rees & 
Frith, 2007). The first class of studies may present stimuli close to threshold (Kim & Blake, 
2005; Macknik, 2006) or, for instance, show ambiguous stimuli with alternating perceptual 
interpretations (Kleinschmidt et al., 2012; Kornmeier & Bach, 2012), and then contrast brain 
responses between trials that differ in awareness of these stimuli. The second class of 
experiments typically contrasts evoked responses or spontaneous brain activity between the 
baseline state of consciousness and different ASCs, such as sleep (Massimini et al., 2010), 
sedation (Långsjö et al., 2012), and minimally conscious states (Boly et al., 2004). The most 
widely used neuroimaging methods to study ASCs are EEG, which records electrical brain 
activity along the scalp (e.g., Voss et al., 2009), fMRI, which measures cerebral blood flow 
coupled with neuronal activity (e.g., Owen et al., 2006), positron emission tomography (PET), 
which detects blood flow or glucose metabolism (e.g., Boly et al., 2008), and combined 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)-EEG, which can assess cortical information flow in 
response to transcranial perturbation of spontaneous electric activity (e.g., Massimini et al., 
2012). It has been argued, however, that the aforementioned neuroimaging methods are very 
unlikely to solve the hard problem of consciousness, as they are spatially and/or temporally 
too coarse to detect the electrophysiologically complex phenomenal level of organization in 
the brain (Revonsuo, 2001). For instance, the speed of neurobiological processes constituting 
consciousness is much faster than the speed of measurement of fMRI or PET scanning, 
whereas the sources of EEG signals registered on the scalp are largely unknown. 
Nevertheless, the neuroimaging studies have helped to detect a number of neural 
correlates (even though not constituents) of altered consciousness, such as a functional 
recoupling of subcortical and fronto-parietal regions upon regaining consciousness after 
anaesthetic-induced unresponsiveness (Långsjö et al., 2012). A recently developed 
perturbational complexity index (PCI), a TMS-EEG measure of cortical information integration 
and differentiation (see Section 2.5.5), can be used to distinguish different levels of 
consciousness in sedation, sleep, and traumatic brain injury (Casali et al., 2013). Yet, many 
such types of studies conflate consciousness with responsiveness and do not systematically 
assess if unresponsive participants still have internally generated subjective experiences 
(Mashour & LaRock, 2008, see also Study I, Section 6.2). Arguably, instead of focusing on the 
raw comparison between the baseline and ASCs, a direct contrast between brain activity 
related to different types of spontaneous subjective experiences when the brain state is 
controlled, such as different types of dreams or dreaming vs. dreamless sleep when the sleep 
stage is kept the same (see Study II, Section 6.3), is more eligible to reveal the neural 
mechanisms of altered phenomenal consciousness. The earlier attempts to start the 
neurophenomenology programme of research, which would systematically match the first-
person data with the large-scale neurodynamics (Varela, 1996), did not flourish, largely 
because of the methodological limitations and biases related to the first-person reports (Lutz 
& Thompson, 2003). This program was also heavily anchored to the philosophical tradition of 
phenomenology (Petitot et al., 1999), the concepts and metaphysical assumptions of which 
were not intuitive for empirical scientists to accept. It is expected that Studies I–VI (see 
Sections 6.2–6.7) will contribute to the development of more controlled and efficient analysis 
of the first-person reports, eventually leading to the more rigorous neuroimaging studies of 
ASCs. 
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5. AIMS OF THE PRESENT THESIS 
The main purpose of this thesis was to investigate subjective experiences and cognitive 
processes in four different types of alterations of consciousness: naturally occurring dreaming, 
cognitively induced hypnosis, pharmacologically induced sedation, and pathological changes of 
consciousness in schizophrenia. More specific goals of the thesis were: 
1. To empirically verify the dissociation between consciousness as responsiveness and 
consciousness as the presence of subjective experiences (Study I, see Section 6.2). 
2. To develop and test new content analysis methods for mapping phenomenology in 
unresponsive states, such as pharmacologically induced sedation (Study I, see Section 
6.2) and natural sleep (Study II, see Section 6.3). 
3. To develop an efficient laboratory paradigm for conducting awakenings and collecting 
data for a contrast between dreaming and dreamless NREM sleep (Study II, see Section 
6.3), and to propose novel approaches for a contrast between lucid and non-lucid 
dreams (Study VI, see Section 6.7). 
4. To contrast dreaming and waking mentation reports collected from psychotic 
schizophrenia patients and healthy controls (Study III, see Section 6.4), and to develop a 
conceptual framework of how these natural and pathological alterations might be 
related (Study IV, see Section 6.5). 
5. To analyse whether dreaming can be treated as a research model of psychotic and/or 
intact waking state of consciousness (Study V, see Section 6.6). 
6. To investigate time perception distortions under cognitively induced hypnosis (Study 
VII, see Section 6.8), and to develop a theoretical framework of how such distortions 
might be associated with other ASCs that undergo similar changes in time perception 
(Study VIII, see Section 6.9). 
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6. ORIGINAL STUDIES 
6.1. General overview 
Deriving from the formulated goals, both empirical and theoretical research were carried out 
in the present thesis (for an overview of all studies, see Table 1). Theoretical studies (IV–VI, 
VIII, see Sections 6.5–6.7, 6.9) reviewed scientific literature and suggested new ways of how 
research of different ASCs could be advanced and integrated. Empirical studies (I–III, VII, see 
Sections 6.2–6.4, 6.8) focused on the specific contrasts between two or more states of 
consciousness (for an overview of contrasted states of mind, see Table 2). Experimental 
paradigms and methods used in these studies are described in the following sections. 
Table 1: General overview of empirical and theoretical studies. 
Studies Participants Rationale Methods Publication type 
I 40 To analyse subjective 
experiences occurring 
under unresponsive 
sedation and to 
demonstrate discrepancy 
between different 
definitions of conscious 
states. 
 Experimentally induced 
sedation. 
 EEG-derived analysis of 
sedation depth. 




II 5 To develop a new 
laboratory paradigm to 
efficiently collect data for 
a contrast between 
minimal NREM dreaming 
and dreamless sleep. 
 PSG. 
 EEG analysis. 




III 10 To analyse bizarreness in 
dreams and to compare 
overall similarity of 
dreaming and 
spontaneous waking 
mentation in healthy 
individuals and psychotic 
patients. 
 Assessment of psychotic 
symptoms, memory 
functioning and sleep 
structure. 
 Content analysis of 
dream reports. 
 Blind categorization of 




IV - To draw a formal scheme 
of how dreaming and 
schizophrenia might be 
related. 
A theoretical paper. An extended invited 
commentary on Zanasi, M., 
Calisti, F., Di Lorenzo, G., 
Valerio, G., & Siracusano, A. 
(2011a). Oneiric activity in 
schizophrenia: Textual 
analysis of dream reports. 
Consciousness and 
Cognition, 20, 337–348. 
V - To evaluate theoretical 
and empirical feasibility of 
using dreaming as a 
research model of waking 
consciousness and/or 
psychosis. 
A theoretical paper. Peer-reviewed review 
article. 
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Studies Participants Rationale Methods Publication type 
VI - To develop experimental 
hypotheses for studying 
dream lucidity and its 
neural correlates by 
focusing on non-lucid or 
pre-lucid dreams. 
A theoretical paper. An extended invited 
commentary on Hobson, A. 
(2009). The neurobiology of 
consciousness: Lucid 
dreaming wakes up. 
International Journal of 
Dream Research, 2, 41–44. 
VII 1 To compare perception of 
duration under hypnosis 
and in the baseline waking 
state. 
 Hypnotic induction. 
 Psychophysical 
assessment of duration 
perception. 




VIII - To propose a formal model 
of how pathological, 
cognitively and 
pharmacologically 
induced, and natural 
distortions of time 
perception might interact. 
A theoretical paper. Invited book chapter. 
Table 2: Experimental contrasts between alterations of consciousness, baseline waking states and 


















































6.2. Study I: Consciousness lost and found: Subjective experiences in an unresponsive 
state (Noreika et al., 2011) 
6.2.1. Methods 
Anaesthesiological definition of consciousness equates it with responsiveness, yet it is 
conceivable to assume that an unresponsive individual may be subjectively conscious 
(Mashour & LaRock, 2008). To test a hypothesized dissociation between the presence of 
subjective experiences and responsiveness in pharmacologically induced alterations of 
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consciousness, 40 right-handed male volunteers (age: M=23.3, SD=2.7; American Society of 
Anesthesiologists physical status I) were sedated in Study I. Four participant groups were 
formed with the following sedative/anaesthetic drugs used to induce sedation: 
dexmedetomidine group – 10 participants (2 sessions each); propofol group – 10 participants 
(2 sessions each); sevoflurane group – 10 participants (1 session each); and xenon group – 10 
participants (1 session each). During all sessions, the depth of sedation was monitored with an 
EEG-derived BIS index (BIS XP, algorithm version 4.0, smoothing rate 15 s, Aspect Medical 
Systems). BIS index is calculated from a signal recorded from an electrode strip attached to the 
forehead, and it ranges from 0, which reflects isoelectric EEG silence, to 100, which is observed 
when an adult participant is fully awake and alert (see Section 3.6). 
Concentration of a dexmedetomidine, propofol or sevoflurane was stepwise increased 
until the loss of responsiveness (LOR). LOR was defined by an absence of behavioural response 
to a verbal command ‘Open your eyes!’, which was requested at 5 min intervals. Due to 
pharmacokinetic properties of xenon, its sedation was induced more abruptly. After 
discontinuation of drug delivery, the regaining of responsiveness (ROR), i.e., the first 
meaningful response to the verbal command ‘Open your eyes!’, was assessed for each drug 
group at 1 min intervals. ROR confirmation was followed by resting EEG recording that lasted 
for 5 min. Afterwards, a structured interview was taken from each participant regarding 
subjective experiences during sedation. The interview was repeated after 10–30 min, when 
participants had recovered from sedation. 
For the analysis of frequency and quality of subjective experiences in post-sedation 
reports, the Subjective Experiences During Anaesthesia Coding System (SEDA-Coding) was 
developed. SEDA-Coding distinguishes 3 categories of subjective experiences: (1) micro-level 
experiences (visual, auditory, sensorimotor, olfactory, gustatory, positive affective, negative 
affective, thought-like); (2) macro-level experiences (dream-like, laboratory-related, out-of-
body experiences, changed experience of time); and (3) white reports when participant 
remembers having had some experiences but cannot recall any specific details. 
6.2.2. Results 
Content analysis of interviews showed that subjective experiences were reported in 58.6% of 
sedation sessions. When reports of the first session were compared across 
sedative/anaesthetic agents, the difference in the frequency of reports with subjective 
contents approached significance (Fisher’s exact test: p=.057, N=40). Individual drug 
comparisons showed that dexmedetomidine sedation was accompanied by higher incidence of 
reports with subjective experiences than propofol sedation (Fisher’s exact test: p<.05, N=20). 
Regarding content categories of SEDA-Coding, the four sedative/anaesthetic agents differed in 
the frequency of reports with laboratory-related experiences (Fisher’s exact test: p<.05, N=40). 
Individual drug comparisons showed that sevoflurane sedation induced more experiences 
related to laboratory, medical team and hospital than dexmedetomidine sedation (Fisher’s 
exact test: p<.01, N=20). 
Analysis of averaged BIS values showed significant differences between propofol, 
dexmedetomidine and sevoflurane sedation during the loss of responsiveness period 
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(repeated measures ANOVA: F(2,27)=5.79, p<.01). In particular, BIS values were lower, 
suggesting a deeper sedation, during propofol (M=60.54) than during sevoflurane (M=70.00) 
sessions (independent t test: t(18)=2.99, p<.01, d=1.41). Similarly, BIS values were lower 
during dexmedetomidine (M=55.10) than during sevoflurane (M=70.00) sessions (independent 
t test: t(18)=2.94, p<.01, d=1.39). Yet, even though dexmedetomidine sedation was 
accompanied by higher frequency of reports with subjective experiences than propofol 
sedation, the BIS values did not differ between these two agents during the loss of 
responsiveness period (independent t test: t(18)=1.07, p=.298). This finding indicates 
independence of the ‘depth’ of sedation required to maintain unresponsiveness as measured 
by the BIS index and the occurrence of subjective experiences during sedation in between-
agent comparisons. 
Within-agent comparison between sessions with the presence of subjective experiences 
and sessions with their absence during a period of dexmedetomidine-induced 
unresponsiveness showed higher BIS values and shallower sedation when experiences were 
present (M=58.60, SD=15.63) compared to sessions when they were absent (M=47.01, 
SD=12.80) (paired samples t test: t(4)=4.58, p=.01, d=2.05). Given that the depth of sedation 
did not differ between the presence and absence of subjective experiences during the 
induction phase (paired samples t test: t(4)=-.87, p>.05) or the recovery phase (paired samples 
t test: t(4)=1.14, p>.05) of dexmedetomidine sessions, these findings provide indirect evidence 
that subjective experiences occurred during the actual period of unresponsiveness. Similar 
inferential statistical analyses were not carried out with other anaesthetic agents due to a low 
number of observations in one of the comparison conditions. 
6.3. Study II: Early-night serial awakenings as a new paradigm for studies on NREM 
dreaming (Noreika et al., 2009) 
6.3.1. Methods 
Aiming to develop an efficient paradigm for studying alterations of consciousness during sleep 
and to describe perceptual complexity and dynamics of NREM sleep dreaming, five volunteer 
students were recruited to take part in Study II (age: M=23.7, 4 females). Each of them spent 
one adaptation night and four non-consecutive experimental nights in the sleep laboratory. A 
novel paradigm, called the early-night serial awakenings (ENSA), was applied during 
experimental nights, with up to 12 awakenings each night from NREM sleep Stages 2 and 3 
during the first 2–4 hours of sleep. Scoring of sleep stages was based on the recordings from 
two EOG and four EEG electrodes (C3, C4, O1, O2). To evaluate the homogeneity of data 
across the serial awakenings produced by the ENSA paradigm, a quantitative EEG analysis of 
possible changes in the spectral power of different frequency bands (delta: 0.5–4.0 Hz, theta: 
4.0–8.0 Hz, alpha: 8.0–12.0 Hz, beta1: 12.0–16.0 Hz, beta2: 16.0–32.0 Hz) was carried out with 
the Brain Vision Analyzer (v1.05.0002) software. 
After each awakening, participants were asked to report ‘everything that was going 
through their mind before awakening’. If participants reported at least one perceptual 
experience, a set of further 18 questions was given, including questions about objects and the 
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self in a dream. Two blinded judges carried out content analysis of post-awakening reports and 
separated three recall categories: (1) reports of dreamless sleep, if participant did not report 
any perceptual experience; (2) reports of white dreaming, if participant remembered having a 
dream, but could not recall any concrete perceptual experiences; and (3) dream reports, if 
participant reported at least one perceptual experience. Complexity and temporal dynamics of 
perceptual experiences in dream reports were further analysed according to the Orlinsky's 
Modified Scale for Perceptual Complexity of Dreams (O-PC-Dreams, following Orlinsky, 1962). 
The O-PC-Dreams consists of 7 categories that describe an overall perceptual complexity of 
subjective reports, ranging from category 1, when participant recalls only a single isolated 
experience, to category 7, when he or she remembers a complex dynamic dream with several 
changes of scenery. Categories 1–4 refer to temporally static dreams, whereas categories 5–7 
refer to temporally dynamic dream experiences (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Orlinsky's Modified Scale for Perceptual Complexity of Dreams (O-PC-Dreams). 
Categories of perceptual 
dynamics 
Categories of perceptual complexity Examples 
Static dream: person 
experiences only static 
percepts and/or never-
ending repetitive actions 
that do not accumulate 
into major perceptual 
changes. 
1. Person remembers a specific topic but 
in isolation: a fragmentary percept, 
unrelated to anything else. 
‘There was a boy.’
2. Person remembers several unrelated 
perceptual experiences. 
‘There was a boy as well as a sound of 
water flow.’ 
3. Person remembers several 
interconnected perceptual 
experiences. 
‘There were several boys sitting on the 
boat.’ 
4. Person remembers a short but 
coherent dream, the parts of which 
seem to be immersed within a unified 
scene. 
‘There were several boys sitting on the 
boat in a river. It was a very sunny day.’ 
Dynamic dream: person 
experiences dynamic 
changes, during which 
something happens, 
followed by some 
consequence or in which 
one perceptual 
experience – object, 
scene, or main interacting 
character – is replaced by 
another. 
5. Person remembers a coherent dream, 
in which something happens within a 
unified scene, i.e., one perceptual 
experience is replaced by another. 
‘There were several boys sitting on the 
boat in a river. It was a very sunny day. 
Then one of them invited me to join 
them and so I did – I was very happy 
about it.’ 
6. Person remembers a long, detailed 
dream in which the whole scene is 
replaced by another scenery. 
‘There were several boys sitting on the 
boat in a river. It was a very sunny day. 
Then one of them invited me to join 
them and so I did – I was very happy 
about it. We navigated downstream for 
a while, and stopped near the riverside 
restaurant. The restaurant had Eastern 
décor with bright colours.’  
 
7. Person remembers a long, detailed 
dream in which the whole scene is 
replaced by another scenery more 
than once. 
‘There were several boys sitting on the 
boat in a river. It was a very sunny day. 
Then one of them invited me to join them 
and so I did – I was very happy about it. 
We navigated downstream for a while, 
and stopped near the riverside 
restaurant. The restaurant had Eastern 
décor with bright colors. Suddenly, one 
stranger in the restaurant became very 
large and scary. I was afraid of him and 
ran outside, which appeared to be a city 
with shining lights and busy streets [etc.].’ 
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6.3.2. Results 
The ENSA paradigm appeared to be practically feasible and data-wise very efficient. On 
average, 8.2 (SD=2.6) awakenings were performed during 20 experimental nights (164 
awakenings as a total), with a mean total recording time of just 193 mins (SD=57.4) per single 
night. There were only 23.5 mins (SD=14.7) on average between two adjacent awakenings. 
During pilot stages of the project a concern was raised of whether participants will be able to 
fall asleep after serial awakenings due to repetitive disruption of normal circadian patterns. 
However, the opposite effect was observed in the main experiment: there was a strong 
negative correlation between the sleep latency and the count of previous awakenings 
(Spearman's rank order correlation: rho=−.98, n=8, p<.001), i.e., the more awakenings the 
participants underwent, the shorter time it took for them to fall asleep again. To investigate 
possible changes in spectral power between the early ENSA awakenings (1–4 awakenings) and 
the late ENSA awakenings (5–12 awakenings), separate 2×4×5 ANOVA tests were carried out 
for Stages 2 and 3 of NREM sleep with the following factors: Awakenings (2: early ENSA, late 
ENSA), Electrodes (C3, C4, O1, O2) and EEG bands (delta, theta, alpha, beta1, beta2). The main 
effect of Awakenings as well as the interactions between the Awakenings and Electrodes or 
EEG Bands were non-significant, indicating a high stability of spectral power patterns across 
the ENSA sessions. 
27 awakenings and subjective reports were excluded from further analysis due to various 
technical problems, and a total of 137 NREM sleep reports were processed further for dream 
content analysis. Analysis of inter-rater judgments indicated strong agreement in scoring of 
reports for the recall categories (89.8% of reports; Cohen's kappa coefficient test: κ=.85) and 
for the categories of perceptual complexity of dreams (78%; κ=.88). Proportions of different 
types of reports between sleep stages were as follows: 23.8% of dreamless, 52.4% of white 
dreaming and 23.8% of dream reports after Stage 2 sleep awakenings; 37.3% of dreamless, 
35.2% of white dreaming, and 27.5% of dream reports after awakenings from transitional 
stage of sleep (which was defined by the first appearance of delta EEG waves); and 29.6% of 
dreamless, 31.8% of white dreaming, and 38.6% of dream reports after Stage 3 sleep 
awakenings. Notably, percentage of white dream reports significantly decreased from Stage 2 
to transition to Stage 3 sleep (one-way ANOVA: F(1.88,7.53)=7.15, p<.05, η2=.64; all pairwise 
comparisons: p<.05). These findings suggest that NREM Stage 3 might be the most suitable 
period of sleep for awakenings that aim to produce comparably high proportions of dreaming 
and dreamless sleep reports. Content analysis using O-PC-Dreams indicated that majority of 41 
NREM dream reports were perceptually simple and static: five dreams fell under category 1, 
two dreams under category 2, eighteen dreams under category 3, fourteen dreams under 
category 4, and only two dreams fell under dynamic category 5. 
To contrast EEG activity between dreaming and dreamless sleep, a follow up study was 
carried out using a higher density EEG setup (25 electrodes) and the same ENSA paradigm. A 
similar efficiency of the data collection was achieved with 10 new participants providing a total 
of 322 reports. Results of this study have not been included in this dissertation as they are still 
being analysed. 
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6.4. Study III: Dream bizarreness and waking thought in schizophrenia (Noreika et al., 
2010a) 
6.4.1. Methods 
Bizarreness of dream experiences seems to remind psychotic perception and cognition 
observed in schizophrenia patients (Kelly, 1998), pointing to phenomenological similarities 
between naturally occurring and pathological ASCs. To test the bizarreness level in dreams of 
psychotic patients, and the resemblance of their waking and sleep mentation, five male 
schizophrenia inpatients (age: M=34.8, SD=6.3) and five male members of the nursing staff 
working at the same hospital (age: M=33.2, SD=6.5) took part in Study III. Inclusion criteria for 
the patients’ group were unambiguous diagnosis of schizophrenia, current psychosis with 
positive symptoms, and well-preserved cognitive functioning, which was assessed by 
experienced psychiatrist. Cognitive functioning of all participants was tested with a detailed 
neuropsychological battery: WAIS tests Similarities, Digit span forward, Digit span backward, 
Digit symbol, Block design, 20 objects naming time, 20 objects immediate recall, 30 paired 
word associates; Benton Visual Memory test; clinical semantic and phonological fluency tests; 
and the Mini-Mental State Examination. For further assessment of memory functioning, in 
particular the recall of perceptual experiences, an ecologically valid experimental test was 
developed. Participants were asked to view a 5-min video recording of people behaving in 
ordinary situations, and afterwards to write down everything that they could recall from the 
video. Furthermore, to exclude possible sleep disorders, patients were monitored for one 
night with the static charge sensitive bed (SCSB) and actometers combined with video 
observation. Even though the SCSB-assessed quality of sleep varied from patient to patient, all 
patients had both quiet and active sleep, and there were no indications of sleep disorders. 
Following clinical assessment, all participants were instructed to collect five dream reports 
by keeping a written dream diary after natural morning awakenings. Waking thought reports 
were collected on five different days by bringing participants to a silent dim room, letting them 
relax on a bed, and after 10 mins asking them to write down everything that was going 
through their mind. Four blind judges classified all dream and waking reports across two axes: 
origin of report (dream/waking thought) and reporter (patient/control). This classification was 
unguided, i.e., the judges were not provided with formal scoring guidelines and had to make 
judgments based on their own subjective criteria. In addition, two judges analysed dream 
reports more formally with the Content Analysis of Bizarreness scale (Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 
1995). This scale evaluates ratios between the bizarre and the non-bizarre occurrences of basic 
dream elements for three different types of bizarreness: incongruity, which refers to a dream 
element inconsistent with waking reality; vagueness, which refers to an obscure or 
indeterminate element; and discontinuity, which refers to an element suddenly (dis)appearing 
or transforming. The agreement in bizarreness classification was 78% for the patients’ and 
86% for the controls’ dream reports. 
6.4.2. Results 
Each of the control participants wrote down five dream reports, whereas the patients 
reported on average 6.8 dreams. The length of dream reports was significantly shorter in the 
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patient group (M=71 words, SD=64.5) than in the control group (M=201 words, SD=114.4) 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Ws=727, p<.001). Arguably, the shorter length of dream reports in 
the patient group did not depend on the more mundane dream contents, but rather on the 
poorly functioning memory of semantic and perceptual experiences, which was evidenced by 
several memory tests. In particular, the patient group performed worse than the control group 
in the WAIS test for immediate recall of paired word associates (independent t test: t(8)=3.2, 
p<.05) and the Benton Visual Memory test (t(8)=2.9, p<.05). Furthermore, patients gave 
significantly shorter reports of the 5-min video recording (word count: M=54, SD=32) than did 
control participants (M=122.2, SD=41.5) (independent t test: t(8)=2.9, p<.05). 
The blind judges made only one mistake in distinguishing dream reports from waking 
thought reports for the control group. However, the same judges misjudged that 52.9% of 
dream reports represent waking thoughts for the patients group compared to no mistakes for 
the controls (Pearson chi-square test: χ2=16.6, df=1, p<.001). Similarly, the judges decided that 
48% of patients’ waking thought reports are dreams, compared to 4% of such mistakes for the 
control group (χ2=10.4, df=1, p<.01). These findings indicate that overall content of reported 
subjective experiences did not differ between nocturnal dreaming and waking consciousness 
in psychotic schizophrenia patients. Regarding the reporter of subjective reports, the judges 
could not distinguish patients and controls, as many of the patients’ waking reports were 
treated as standard dreams of control participants. Content analysis of dream reports using 
the Bizarreness scale showed that 33.2% of dream elements were bizarre in the patient group, 
compared to 20.7% of such elements in the control group (χ2=38.1, df=1, p<.001). The largest 
differences between the study groups were in the Incongruity (χ2=21.3, df=1, p<.001) and 
Vagueness (χ2=43.0, df=1, p<.001) categories of subjective content bizarreness. 
6.5. Study IV: Dreaming and waking experiences in schizophrenia: How should the 
(dis)continuity hypotheses be approached empirically? (Noreika, 2011) 
6.5.1. Literature review 
Empirical findings regarding subjective contents of dreaming in schizophrenia patients are 
often interpreted in the framework of the continuity hypothesis (e.g., Kramer & Roth, 1973; 
Stompe et al., 2003; Zanasi et al., 2011a). Most generally, the continuity hypothesis suggests 
that subjective experiences in dreaming are modulated by or are a reflection of subjective 
experiences during wakefulness (Schredl, 2003). For instance, Schredl and Hofmann (2003) 
showed that the amount of time spent driving a car and reading during wakefulness correlates 
positively with frequency of these activities in dreams. Following a similar theoretical 
background, Zanasi et al. (2011a) compared dream reports of 123 schizophrenia patients and 
123 healthy individuals using linguistic textual analysis methods. Some of their findings, such 
as a decreased frequency of hearing-related lemmas in schizophrenia dreams, were 
interpreted as reflecting schizophrenia-related impairments during wakefulness. In particular, 
the reduced frequency of hearing words in dream reports of schizophrenia patients was 
hypothetically related to the auditory memory deficits, which are frequently observed in 
schizophrenia patients during wakefulness (Zanasi et al., 2011a). In Study IV, the continuity 
interpretation of schizophrenic dreams was critically examined, arguing that it is not fully 
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substantiated in Zanasi et al. (2011a) as well as in several other studies on schizophrenia 
dreaming. 
6.5.2. Original proposal 
Conceptually, interaction between dream and waking experiences could have a form of 
‘continuity’, ‘discontinuity’ or ‘independence’. Continuity hypothesis would be supported by a 
positive correlation of rates of certain experiences, for example, meeting strangers, in dream 
and waking thought reports. Causally, continuity hypothesis could be further divided into the 
‘waking-to-dreaming’ hypothesis, which states that a frequent occurrence of certain waking 
experiences increase the frequency of their occurrence in dreams (e.g., Schredl & Hofmann, 
2003), and the ‘dreaming-to-waking’ hypothesis. In the context of psychosis studies, the latter 
hypothesis would state that certain dream experiences might intrude into waking 
consciousness (e.g., Hempel et al., 2003). Contrary to the continuity hypothesis, discontinuity 
hypothesis would predict a negative correlation between the frequencies of certain type of 
experiences in waking and dream reports (e.g., Cartwright, 1972), possibly referring to a 
hypothetical compensatory mechanism that stabilizes the total rate of certain experiences. For 
example, increase in the frequency of certain dream experiences might be related to their 
decrease during wakefulness in a case of the ‘compensated waking’ discontinuity, and the 
opposite would be true in a case of the ‘compensated dreaming’ discontinuity. Finally, the 
independence hypothesis would predict no association between waking and dreaming 
experiences. 
Importantly, these possibilities are not mutually exclusive and while some of the 
experiences may show mismatch between different states of consciousness, other experiences 
may be continuous or vary independently between the states of consciousness under 
investigation. Thus, even though there is an increasing evidence for the continuity between 
waking and dreaming in psychosis (Arnulf et al., 2000; Hempel et al., 2003; Vita et al., 2008), 
some of the experiences may be discontinuous or independent. For example, the reduced 
frequency of hearing-related words in dream reports of schizophrenia patients (Zanasi et al., 
2011a), which was originally interpreted by the authors as reflecting continuity with the 
auditory sensory memory deficits found in schizophrenia during wakefulness (e.g., Kasai et al., 
2003), may have an alternative explanation. In particular, it is known that up to 74% of 
schizophrenia patients report elevated levels of auditory hallucinations, or ‘voices’, during 
wakefulness (Sartorius et al., 1974). Therefore, reduced hearing experiences in dreams might 
balance out increased levels of auditory hallucinations in waking life, as predicted by the 
hypothetical compensatory discontinuity of mental contents. Zanasi et al. (2011b) replied that 
such a suggestion does not take into consideration that schizophrenia patients tend to have 
not only auditory but also visual hallucinations, while no reduction of sight-related words was 
observed in their dream reports, which is not compatible with the ‘compensatory hypothesis’. 
A further response to their reply would be that perceptual and cognitive interactions between 
different states of consciousness are multidimensional and that the discontinuity of auditory 
experiences does not exclude a possible independence or continuity of visual experiences. 
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6.6. Study V: How to integrate dreaming into a general theory of consciousness – A critical 
review of existing positions and suggestions for future research (Windt & Noreika, 
2011) 
6.6.1. Literature review 
As the most frequently occurring natural ASC, dreaming could be regarded as an important 
phenomenon for testing predictions derived from the dominating theories of consciousness. 
However, recent attempts to integrate research of dreaming with the mainstream cognitive 
neuroscience of consciousness and cognition (Hobson et al., 2000; Nir & Tononi, 2010; 
Revonsuo, 2006; Schwartz & Maquet, 2002) did not yield yet straightforward results. The most 
programmatic yet rather contradictory suggestions treat dreaming as a model system 
continuous or similar either with the standard waking consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006) or with 
the pathological wake states (Hobson et al., 2000). Formally, dreaming can function as a 
research model of the explanatory target in at least three different ways: as a global model 
(when it replicates all or most of the central features of the explanatory target); as a restricted 
model (when it replicates some of the features of the explanatory target); or as a model via 
negative analogy (when it is systematically dissimilar from the explanatory target). 
Perhaps the most detailed proposal of how to treat dreaming as a research model of 
waking consciousness was developed by Revonsuo (1995b, 2000, 2006), who argued that 
dreaming is a pure form of consciousness, isolated from ontologically confounding sensory 
inputs and motor outputs, yet containing the fundamental properties of consciousness, such 
as the presence of multimodal sensory experiences and an immersion in the world simulation. 
Given that subjective qualities of dreaming are continuous with the subjective qualities of 
waking consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006), the former could be regarded as a global model of 
the latter. From this perspective, analyses of the functional organization and neural 
mechanisms of dreaming are expected to identify the fundamental properties of waking 
consciousness. While agreeing on the usefulness of dreaming as a simplified domain for 
studying waking consciousness, Churchland (1988) took an antagonistic approach to that of 
Revonsuo (2006) and argued that there are characteristic differences between dreaming and 
wakefulness, such as the level of cognitive bizarreness. Consequently, dreaming can be treated 
as a model of wakefulness via negative analogy, which may reveal systematic differences 
between these states of consciousness. In this case modelling relationship may show that 
there is no single homogeneous underlying organizing principle of consciousness. 
Hobson (1996, 1999, 2001) argued that hallucinations and cognitive deficiencies demarcate 
dreaming from the standard waking consciousness. However, dreaming can still be regarded 
as a global model of conscious mind, yet not of its intact form, but of pathological psychoses, 
for example, delirium tremens. In addition to similar phenomenology, both dreaming (or 
rather REM sleep) and clinical delirium are marked by a shift towards cholinergic 
neuromodulation of the brain when compared to a standard waking state (Hobson, 1999). 
Neurobiological resemblance between REM sleep and another psychopathology, 
schizophrenia, was further detailed by Gottesmann (2006), who argued that natural REM sleep 
is a remarkable collection of schizophrenia endophenotypes. Several other authors took a 
somewhat more modest position and proposed that dreaming could serve as a restricted 
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model of some aspects of psychopathologies rather than claiming an overall continuity 
between them. For instance, dreaming could serve to study the lack of involvement and 
emotion expression in schizophrenia (Hadjez et al., 2003), or several types of psychotic or 
neurological delusions that are common in dreams, such as age disorientation, paranoid 
experience of threats (Kelly, 1998), and delusional misidentifications, for example, mis- or 
hyper-identification of faces (Schwartz & Maquet, 2002). 
Overall, there is very little consensus among researchers working on dreaming as to 
whether it can be treated as a model of wakefulness, and of what type of waking state: an 
intact consciousness or a psychotic mind. Furthermore, diverging views on the (dis)similarities 
between the waking and dreaming states result in the choice of different types of modelling 
relationships, for example, a global or a restricted modelling of waking consciousness if 
dreaming and wakefulness are regarded as similar (Revonsuo, 2006), and a modelling via 
negative analogy if they are regarded as dissimilar (Churchland, 1988). 
6.6.2. Original proposal 
Regarding proposals of using dreaming as a model of waking consciousness, which are often 
contradictory and even antagonistic (e.g., Hobson, 2001; Revonsuo, 2006), three types of 
problems were raised in Study V: (1) theoretical; (2) adequacy; and (3) practical feasibility 
concerns. Theoretical concerns deal with the concept of modelling and its representational 
relationship with the explanatory target. The strongest possible relationship is seen in the 
proposals of the global model of dreaming, some of which argue for the isomorphism, i.e., an 
identity between the model and its explanatory target, leaving little explanatory value in the 
modelling relationship. A more adequate relationship between a model and its explanatory 
target may be defined in terms of similarity, leaving dissimilar properties aside. Yet, the 
relevant degree of similarity is very difficult to define, as there is an infinite number of ways in 
which any two objects (or states of consciousness) can be similar or dissimilar (Wartofsky, 
1979). Consequently, the relevant (dis)similarities have to be determined by researchers who 
may have different views regarding the key aspects of the mental states that can serve as a 
model, making the modelling relationship theory- and interest-dependent. For instance, the 
proposal for investigating dreaming as a model of natural waking consciousness presumes that 
dreaming is continuous with standard consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006). By contrast, the 
proposal of using dreaming as a model of pathological psychoses emphasizes 
neurophysiological and phenomenological dissimilarities between dreaming and standard 
waking states, and presumes continuity between dreaming and delirium tremens (Hobson, 
1999, 2001). 
Given that a widely accepted theory of dreaming is not yet in place, all uses of dreaming as 
a model of waking consciousness are naturally controversial. This raises a more general 
concern of whether it is adequate to use dreaming as a model of another conscious state 
when a scientific theory of dreaming itself is still limited, including its neural basis, function, 
and even definition (Windt, 2010). Arguably, scientific modelling can be successful only if a 
selected model is already well-understood, allowing the transfer of this knowledge to the 
understanding of the modelling target. Given that psychoses and waking consciousness are 
much more widely studied than dreaming, it is rather unlikely that a less researched dreaming 
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can serve as a model of more explored states of consciousness. One may argue that this 
situation would rapidly change if more resources would be directed towards research of 
dreaming, however, a number of practical feasibility concerns raise doubt if a fast progress is 
likely to happen. A successful research model, such as the drosophila melanogaster model in 
genetics and biology (Arias, 2008), should provide large datasets in a relatively short time, 
observations and experimental manipulations with it should be relatively easy, and its running 
costs should be relatively low. Experimental research of dreaming seems to be an example of 
the opposite. Most notably, efficiency of data collection is very low, allowing for instance only 
four or five observations of REM sleep dreams during the whole night of recording, and even 
the more efficient ENSA paradigm enables to collect only about 10 NREM sleep reports in 
three hours (see Study II, Section 6.3), which is far from the efficiency of typical cognitive 
psychology paradigms that allow hundreds of observations (or trials) in a period of one hour or 
so (e.g., Study VII, Section 6.8). Furthermore, given that a neural marker of dreaming, such as 
P300 as a marker of conscious attention (Chennu et al., 2013), is unknown, the presence of 
dreaming can be observed only indirectly, through subjective reports that are affected by 
post-awakening amnesia, especially for schizophrenia patients (Okuma et al., 1970), making 
the dreaming model of psychosis particularly vulnerable to the mnemonic biases (see Sections 
4.1 and 4.2). Manipulation with dream content, such as through a sensory stimulation at the 
sub-awakening threshold (e.g., Schredl et al., 2009) or through a transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) of cortex (as suggested in Study VI, see Section 6.7), is not always successful 
and often leads to somewhat unpredictable changes of dream content or even worse, to 
unintentional awakenings. Finally, laboratory research of dreaming requires long scanning 
hours and expensive personnel, partially explaining why there are so few neuroimaging 
studies of the neural mechanisms of dreaming. 
Instead of a modelling relationship between dreaming and standard or abnormal waking 
states, which presumes a continuity between dreaming and waking consciousness, a more 
modest but also arguably a more promising approach is suggested in Study V, namely running 
a series of contrastive analyses studies (Baars, 1994) that would systematically compare 
dreaming and waking states. Contrary to the modelling approach, contrastive analyses do not 
rely on a unidirectional reasoning regarding relationship between two states under contrast, 
but instead, they systematically compare various possible similarities and dissimilarities 
between two contrasts. Instead of increasing the controversy between different proposals of 
dream modelling (Hobson, 2001; Revonsuo, 2006), contrastive analysis may be able to 
integrate diverging research lines by comparing dreaming with both standard waking state and 
pathological alterations of consciousness. In addition to a series of contrasts between 
dreaming and a passive standard or psychotic mentation (e.g., regarding self, cognitive 
bizarreness, metacognition, beliefs), a promising new endeavour may be analysis of 
(dis)similarities between dreaming (or lucid dreaming) and other natural, cognitively or 
pharmacologically induced ASCs, such as out-of-body experiences, hypnotic hallucinations or 
hallucinogenic psychomodulation. Arguably, contrastive analysis program may finally identify 
the most consistent similarities and dissimilarities between dreaming and waking states, which 
may also eventually lead to a restricted modelling program that would focus on a selected 
well-established contrast. 
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6.7. Study VI: New perspectives for the study of lucid dreaming: From brain stimulation to 
philosophical theories of self-consciousness (Noreika et al., 2010b) 
6.7.1. Literature review 
Cognitive deficiencies of REM sleep dreaming, such as a loss of rational thought, orientational 
instability and impaired self-reflection (Hobson et al., 2000; Kahn, 2007), are distinctive 
features of arguably the most intense natural ASC. It has been suggested that impaired dream 
cognition may be caused by hypoactivation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) during 
REM sleep (Hobson et al., 2000; Maquet et al., 2005; Muzur et al., 2002). However, not all of 
the REM sleep dreams are irrational (Meier, 1993). In particular, lucid dreaming is 
characterized by metacognitive insight into the hallucinatory nature of the dream state. It has 
been hypothesized that lucid dreaming is associated with a reactivation of DLPFC during REM 
sleep (Hobson et al., 2000; Kahn & Hobson, 2005), which was recently confirmed in an 
EEG/fMRI study by Dresler et al. (2012). 
Lucid dreaming is thus dissimilar from both standard waking consciousness and typical 
REM sleep dreaming. In particular, perceptual experiences in lucid dreaming are hallucinatory 
unlike in wakefulness but similar to typical dreams, whereas cognitive abilities in lucid 
dreaming are much stronger than in non-lucid dreaming but somewhat similar to cognition in 
wakefulness. At the electrophysiological level of description, Voss et al. (2009) showed that 
lucid dreaming is associated with higher EEG gamma power over frontal regions when 
compared to non-lucid REM sleep dreams. When compared to waking state characterized by 
high alpha band coherence, lucid dreaming was found to have higher coherence in the delta 
and theta band spectrum. Following these observations, wakefulness, typical REM sleep 
dreaming, and lucid dreaming were suggested to be three sharply distinct states of 
consciousness (Hobson, 2009). However, differences between lucid and non-lucid dreaming 
may not be as sharp as previously suggested, but instead certain elements of dream lucidity 
may occur in non-lucid dreams (Windt, 2012; Windt & Metzinger, 2007), pointing to a gradual 
transition between different alterations of consciousness. 
6.7.2. Original proposal 
Even though lucid and non-lucid dreams seem to be very different with respect to their 
cognitive clarity, it is known that cognition in the form of speech and thought may occur in 
typical dreams (Kahn & Hobson, 2005; Meier, 1993), while lucid dreamers may sometimes lack 
full control of their actions and may show somewhat erratic reasoning (Brooks & Vogelsong, 
1999; LaBerge & DeGracia, 2000). Arguably, there might be a slow gradation of different levels 
of cognition and insight from clearly non-lucid to the most intense lucid dreams. In particular, 
there seems to be a variety of the so called pre-lucid dreams, which are characterized by 
partial awareness of being in a dream (Brooks & Vogelsong, 1999). In the strongest sense of 
dream lucidity, it involves full cognitive clarity, including abilities to control the dream and to 
access autobiographical memory (Metzinger, 2009; Tart, 1988). This type of lucid dreams 
would be clearly different from the typical REM sleep dreams that have very limited and 
selective access to autobiographical memories (Windt & Metzinger, 2007). However, there 
may be many other types of dreams that are lucid in a weaker sense. 
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At least five different types of lucidity can be distinguished: attentional A-lucidity; 
behavioural B-lucidity; emotional E-lucidity; and cognitive C-lucidity; all of which together 
would form the full-scale F-lucidity (Windt & Metzinger, 2007). These distinctions are based on 
the availability of different types of information that reveal the virtual nature of a particular 
dream. A-lucidity takes place when a dreamer becomes capable of focusing their attention to 
the virtual fantasy-like aspects of dreaming. B-lucidity emerges when a dreamer gains a 
deliberate control over specific dream objects, characters or the whole dream plot, showing 
signs of lucid behaviour. E-lucidity is characterized by emotional reactions to dream events 
that would not be appropriate if these events would take place during wakefulness, but 
instead they are coherent given the virtual character of the dream. C-lucidity takes place when 
virtual reality of a dream becomes available to cognition and thought, and a dreamer begins to 
reason abstractly about the virtual nature of a dream. This type of lucidity forms the core of 
most of the definitions of lucid dreaming (Hobson, 2009; LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000; 
Metzinger, 2009; Tart, 1988). Notably, A-, B- and E-lucidity types alone are not sufficient to 
form a convincing case of lucid dreaming; instead, they can be regarded as cases of pre-lucid 
dreams. Nevertheless, A-, B- and E-lucidity forms are required for the fully-fledged F-lucidity 
that would encompass all aspects of lucid dreaming. 
Arguably, dream lucidity is a complex and graded phenomenon that ranges from isolated 
aspects of A-, B- or E- pre-lucid dreams to cognitively lucid dreams, in which a dreamer 
recognizes the virtual nature of a dream, to the full-scale lucidity with all aspects of mental 
functioning showing a coherent response to the internally generated dream events. Therefore, 
lucid dreaming is not sharply discontinuous from other types of dreaming, but instead its 
levels may fluctuate, i.e., increase or decrease, within a broader distribution of dream reports 
or even within a single dream. Thus, instead of dichotomous categorisation between lucid and 
non-lucid dreams, a more gradual measure could be applied to study lucid dreaming, such as 
the recently developed Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams scale (LuCid; Voss et al., 2013). 
The use of such scales would allow studying certain aspects of dream lucidity in the more 
frequent typical or pre-lucid dreams. Furthermore, neural mechanisms of lucidity as a gradual 
measure could be studied by a parametric interference with the natural brain functioning 
during REM sleep, such as by applying tDCS over DLPFC. Hypothetically, such stimulation 
would alter dream lucidity, and controlled manipulation with either the intensity or the 
duration of tDCS would result into a changing degree of lucidity. 
6.8. Study VII: Perception of short time scale intervals in a hypnotic virtuoso (Noreika et 
al., 2012) 
6.8.1. Methods 
Among non-pathological ASCs, changes in time processing, which is a fundamental dimension 
of the stream of consciousness (see Section 2.2.1), are most frequently studied in hypnosis. 
Typically, hypnotized individuals underestimate supra-second intervals when compared to the 
duration estimates obtained from the baseline waking state, which has been linked to the 
increased absorption and limited attentional resources for monitoring time-related cues (for a 
review, see Naish, 2007). However, none of the previous hypnosis studies has investigated 
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possible changes in the sub-second interval range, which provides temporal axis for feature 
binding, and which can be analysed with the currently available cognitive models of time 
perception (e.g., Wearden, 1992). To study duration perception in this interval range, a case 
study (Study VII) was carried out with an experienced hypnosis virtuoso T.S.-H. (female, 43 
years old), who has previously taken part in a number of hypnosis studies (Fingelkurts An. et 
al., 2007; Fingelkurts Al. et al., 2007; Kallio et al., 1999, 2005, 2011). T.S.-H. can experience 
vivid auditory and visual hallucinations under hypnosis, and she immediately responds to a 
posthypnotic suggestion of being hypnotized again without any standard induction 
procedures, which is associated with only exceptionally susceptible individuals. In the present 
study hypnosis was induced and cancelled by a single word, which was suggested during 
previous hypnosis sessions. 
Two behavioural experiments of auditory duration perception were carried out within and 
outside hypnosis using Inquisit 3 program (Millisecond Software, 2008). During the repeated-
standards temporal generalization experiment, the participant listened to pairs of tones (500 
Hz) consisting of a standard tone (either 600 ms or 1000 ms) followed by a probe tone (for 600 
ms standard: 300, 450, 600, 750, or 900 ms; for 1000 ms standard: 500, 750, 1000, 1250, or 
1500 ms). The participant was instructed to report by pressing keyboard buttons whether the 
two tones were the same or not. During the time estimation task, the participant listened to 
different durations around 3 seconds (2100 ms, 2400 ms, 2700 ms, 3000 ms, 3300 ms, 3600 
ms, and 3900 ms; all 500 Hz). After each stimulus the participant reported by a button press 
whether the sound was three seconds long or not. 
6.8.2. Results 
In temporal generalization experiment, baseline and hypnosis conditions differed when probes 
were compared to the 600 ms standard, but not when probes were compared to the 1000 ms 
standard. In particular, fewer ‘same’ responses were given under hypnosis than in the baseline 
condition when the 600 ms standard was compared to a 450 ms probe (χ2=4.5, df=1, p<.05, 
Cramer's V=.24), whereas more ‘same’ responses were given under hypnosis than in the 
baseline condition when 600 ms standard was compared to a 750 ms probe (χ2=6.3, df=1, 
p<.05, Cramer's V=.28). Temporal generalization was inspected further by plotting the counts 
of ‘same’ responses against the probe duration divided by the standard duration in the 600 ms 
and 1000 ms conditions, separately for hypnosis and baseline states of consciousness. 
Temporal generalization gradients, i.e., functions representing 600 ms and 1000 ms 
conditions, did not superimpose well in the baseline state, suggesting violation of the scalar 
property of timing in a sub-second-to-second scale. On the contrary, temporal generalization 
gradients superimposed well under hypnosis, indicating more orderly interval timing in 
hypnosis than in the baseline waking state. Modelling of behavioural responses suggested that 
T.S.-H. had higher sensitivity to the sub-second intervals in hypnosis than in the baseline 
waking state. In addition, the distortion parameter showed the opposite memory bias for the 
600 ms standard in the two states of consciousness: underestimation of standard in the 
baseline state, and overestimation of standard in hypnosis. 
In the time estimation experiment, responses indicating ‘3-second’ judgement peaked at 
2100 ms in the baseline condition and at 2700 ms under hypnosis. These findings replicate 
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earlier reports showing that supra-second intervals are underestimated in hypnosis when 
compared to the baseline waking state (e.g., Naish, 2001). It seems that hypnosis facilitated 
sub-second and inhibited supra-second perception, providing further support to a theory of 
two distinct timing systems in the brain (Lewis & Miall, 2003).  
6.9. Study VIII: Variability of duration perception: From natural and induced alterations to 
psychiatric disorders (Noreika et al., 2014) 
6.9.1.  Literature review 
One of the most distinctive cognitive distortions, which may open up new possibilities for 
studying ASCs, is the change of perceived duration, as for instance reported by a hospitalized 
psychiatric patient: ‘I can't estimate time. […] I noticed my watch was accelerated... […] The 
time you keep here isn't Greenwich time’ (Lewis, 1932, p. 617–618). Distorted perception of 
duration has been reported in many pathological ASCs, including stimulant dependence 
(Wittmann et al., 2007), mania (Bschor et al., 2004), borderline personality disorder (Berlin et 
al., 2005), and most notably, schizophrenia (Carroll et al., 2008) and depression (Gil & Droit-
Volet, 2009). Patients with schizophrenia tend to overestimate intervals as if the subjective 
time is going faster for them (Densen, 1977; Johnson & Petzel, 1971; Tysk, 1983a, 1983b; Wahl 
& Sieg, 1980), while patients with depression tend to underestimate durations (Gil & Droit-
Volet, 2009), although, these findings are not always replicated (for schizophrenia, see Carroll 
et al., 2008; for depression, see Bschor et al., 2004). Time perception may also change in non-
pathological ASCs, such as dreaming (Moiseeva, 1975) or LSD psychomodulation (Aronson et 
al., 1959). Likewise, research of duration perception under hypnosis reveals very consistent 
findings of underestimation of temporal intervals (Bowers, 1979; Naish, 2001; Noreika et al., 
2012 (Study VII, Section 6.8); St. Jean & MacLeod, 1983; for a review, see Naish, 2007). 
Notably, changes in perceived duration are not limited to alterations of consciousness. 
Contrary to this, they seem to be rather frequent, albeit less intense and somewhat unnoticed, 
in normal waking life. In has been shown in numerous studies that perception of duration 
changes depending on such diverse natural factors as: emotions (Angrilli et al., 1997; Gil et al., 
2007), physical properties of stimuli (Wearden et al., 1998; Xuan et al., 2007), environmental 
effects of light (Aschoff & Daan, 1997; Morita et al., 2007), colour (Humphrey & Keeble, 1977), 
space (Collett, 1974), and menstrual (Montgomery, 1979; Morofushi et al., 2001) or circadian 
(Aritake-Okada et al., 2009; Kuriyama et al. 2005) cycles. For instance, Nakajima et al. (1998) 
instructed participants to sit on a chair for a period of 36 hours (this is not a typo!), and each 
second hour participants were asked to produce 10 s and 60 s intervals. The produced 
durations were the longest early in the morning, revealing a circadian modulation of time 
perception. 
Numerous reports of cognitive instability of duration perception demonstrate the 
enormous flexibility of time processing mechanisms. Interestingly, behaviourally very similar if 
not identical changes of duration perception can be observed in various waking life situations 
and naturally occurring, cognitively or pharmacologically induced and pathological ASC, such 
as a comparable underestimation of duration in depression (Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009) and 
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hypnosis (Naish, 2001). What are the underlying causes of such distortions of duration 
perception, and would understanding them partially explain the relationship between 
different states of consciousness? Do behavioural similarities in duration perception imply that 
healthy individuals may occasionally undergo pathological abnormalities of duration 
perception, which can be otherwise observed in patients with neuropsychiatric disorders? 
Would it be possible to regard artificially induced changes of duration perception as a model 
of pathological alterations of time? To address these questions, a formal model of intra- and 
inter-individual distortions of duration perception was developed in Study VIII. 
6.9.2.  Original proposal 
It was proposed in Study VIII that duration perception is a multifactorial function unifying a 
large number of externally (e.g., spatial properties of the environment) and internally (e.g., 
phase of menstrual cycle) driven factors. Thus, a perceived duration Dperceived depends on the 
physical duration Dphysical and a number n of modulating factors xi whose effects can be 
mathematically described by functions fi. Thus, Dperceived can be regarded as a product of Dphysical 
and all relevant functions fn: 
Dperceived = Dphysical · f1(x1) · . . . · fn(xn)           
Each function fi has its own range of possible values, e.g., f1 may have a range of [0.6–0.9], 
while f2 may have a range of [1.1–1.5]. Function values < 1 shorten Dperceived and function 
values > 1 lengthen Dperceived, e.g., f1 with a range of [0.6–0.9] will result in the shorter Dperceived 
than Dphysical. Distinct factors may also cancel each other’s effects, e.g., if a value of f1(x1) is 1.25 
and the value of f2(x2) is 0.8, and all other functions have a value of 1, then Dphysical of 10 sec 
yields a precise Dperceived: 
Dperceived = Dphysical · f1(x1) · f2(x2) · . . . · fn(xn) = 10 · 1.25 · 0.8 · 1 · … ·  1 = 10 (sec)           
Furthermore, factors capable of modulating duration perception can either be independent or 
form clusters of mutually dependent factors. For instance, Kuriyama et al. (2005) 
demonstrated that a fluctuation of produced intervals over a 30-hour period correlates with 
the core body temperature, suggesting that the circadian and temperature factors are 
associated. Contrary to this, factor of colour (Humphrey & Keeble, 1977) might be 
independent of the circadian and temperature factors: 
Dperceived = Dphysical · fcolor(xred) · . . . · fn(xn) ·  fcycle(xcircadian, xtemperature) · . . . · fm(xm, ym, . . . )  
Regarding the occurrence of distortions of duration perception, there are several routes of 
how functions can modulate Dperceived. First, Dperceived differences between the standard and 
pathological states of consciousness might be related to the ordinary variability in duration 
processing, defined by the width of a possible range of function values. For instance, f1 with a 
range of [0.5–1.5] in a healthy person might correspond to f1 with a range of [0.5–1.1] in a 
depressed patient and a range of [0.9–1.5] in a psychotic patient. In line with these formal 
possibilities, Morofushi et al. (2001) reported that healthy women produced longer durations 
at 20:00 in the early luteal phase and at 08:00, 14:00, and 20:00 in the follicular phase of the 
menstrual cycle, when compared to other phases of the circadian and menstrual cycles. On 
the contrary, no within-participant variation of Dperceived was observed in women with 
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premenstrual syndrome, suggesting that a range of function values may have been narrowed 
in the premenstrual syndrome group. The range of function values may also broaden, e.g., 
from [0.5–1.5] to [0.2–1.6], or shift, e.g., from [0.5–1.5] to [0.4–1.4], between different states 
of consciousness or under different naturalistic conditions. 
Another possible route for the occurrence of Dperceived distortions is the involvement of 
different modulating factors. Factor reduction would take place if some of the functions 
modulating duration perception in one ASC would show a value of 1 in another state of 
brain/mind. Likewise, factor increase would take place if a factor with a value of 1 in one state 
would change its value in another state of consciousness. Obviously, a difference between 
factor reduction and factor increase is relative and depends on which state of consciousness is 
regarded as a baseline. Arguably, when a standard waking state is compared to a non-
pathological or pathological ASC, the first one should be regarded as the baseline for a 
contrast between the states. More conceptual complications emerge when several ASCs are 
compared, in which case the baseline choice may depend on the research pragmatics, for 
example, the more investigated state could be regarded as a baseline state for another ASC. 
Assuming that behavioural associations of Dperceived between pathological and non-
pathological ASCs are functionally grounded, an intriguing possibility is to model Dperceived 
distortions in psychiatric disorders (e.g., depression) by means of inducing alterations of 
consciousness (e.g., hypnosis) in healthy individuals. However, conceptual analysis of the 
Dperceived model shows that cognitive similarities between the naturally occurring, induced and 
pathological ASCs do not necessarily imply the same underlying functions and/or their values. 
Thus, convincing modeling of pathological distortions of Dperceived by studying healthy 
participants in non-pathological states of consciousness requires more direct evidence that the 
underlying variability sources are the same in both states of consciousness. Future studies 
should focus on the development of tools to identify different causes of Dperceived variability. For 
instance, a broadening or a narrowing of the range of function values could be inferred from 
the respective increases or decreases in variation coefficients, e.g., intra-individual standard 
deviation of Dperceived scores. A shift of the range could be suspected from changes in the 
central tendency, e.g., mean of Dperceived. Factor reduction or increase could be inferred from 
significant group x factor interactions, when certain factors show an impact on Dperceived in one 
group only. Until such studies are carried out, despite some intriguing similarities between 
duration perception in different alterations of consciousness, possibilities for their modeling 




The main aims of this dissertation were to advance theory of how different alterations of 
consciousness are related, and to propose new efficient experimental paradigms for studying 
subjective experiences and their changes in ASCs. The results were published in eight studies, 
four empirical (Studies I–III, VII, see Sections 6.2–6.4, 6.8) and four theoretical (Studies IV–VI, 
VIII, see Sections 6.5–6.7, 6.9). While theoretical studies focused largely on dreaming (Studies 
IV–VI, see Sections 6.5–6.7), which is the most common paradigmatic ASC, each of the 
empirical studies investigated subjective experiences and/or cognitive processes in different 
types of ASCs: naturally occurring dreaming (Study II, see Section 6.3), cognitively induced 
hypnosis (Study VII, see Section 6.8), pharmacologically induced sedation (Study I, see Section 
6.2), and pathological alteration of consciousness in schizophrenia (Study III, see Section 6.4). 
It was found that phenomenal consciousness does not necessarily diminish in unresponsive 
states of consciousness. In particular, research participants reported having had subjective 
experiences in more than 50% of unresponsive sedation sessions (Study I, see Section 6.2). 
Likewise, minimal static dreams were reported in about 30% of the early night NREM sleep 
awakenings (Study II, see Section 6.3). In Studies I and II, new methods were successfully 
introduced for the content analysis of subjective reports, namely the Orlinsky's Modified Scale 
for Perceptual Complexity of Dreams (O-PC-Dreams) and the Subjective Experiences during 
Anaesthesia Coding System (SEDA-Coding). A further methodological advancement was the 
application of a new early-night serial awakenings (ENSA) paradigm, which enabled the 
collection of a large number of dream reports in a relatively short time (Study II, see Section 
6.3). It was also suggested that lucid dreaming, which is one of the most complicated ASCs to 
investigate due to its infrequency, could be studied by analysing different aspects of lucidity in 
the so-called pre-lucid dreams (Study VI, see Section 6.7). Content analysis of dreams of 
psychotic patients indicated higher bizarreness level when compared to dreams of healthy 
controls (Study III, see Section 6.4). Blind judges were not able to distinguish above chance 
level patients’ dream and waking mentation reports, indicating a close phenomenological 
resemblance between psychotic dreaming and wakefulness (Study III, see Section 6.4). Yet, 
causal relationship between these states of consciousness remains uncertain. It was argued 
that dreaming may modulate subjective contents of waking consciousness, or likewise that 
waking consciousness may modulate dream experiences, or that these states of consciousness 
may be independent (Study IV, see Section 6.5). Regarding more ambitious suggestions to 
treat dreaming as a model of waking consciousness, a number of theoretical, adequacy and 
practical feasibility issues were raised, indicating that such suggestions are not likely to 
develop into influential research programs (Study V, see Section 6.6). Instead, more modest 
contrastive analyses were suggested between different states of consciousness, comparing 
their phenomenology, cognitive processes and neural mechanisms. Behavioural analysis and 
modelling of time perception in a hypnotic virtuoso found a more consistent perceptual timing 
under hypnosis than in the waking state (Study VII, see Section 6.8). Theoretical analyses of 
time perception studies led to the proposal of a new framework of how time distortions in 
different ASCs and natural fluctuations might be cognitively related, but have diverse 
underlying causes and mechanisms (Study VIII, see Section 6.9). In the following sections, the 
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most important findings are discussed in more detail, placing them in a context of 
contemporary research of ASCs. 
7.1. Methodological advancements 
To map subjective experiences in unresponsive states of consciousness, two scoring systems 
were developed for the content analysis of subjective post-alteration reports: the SEDA-
Coding (Study I, see Section 6.2) and the O-PC-Dreams (Study II, see Section 6.3). The SEDA-
Coding was designed with the aim to assess the presence of different types of subjective 
qualities (e.g., the presence of visual consciousness) rather than the exact contents of 
consciousness (e.g., experience of individual visual images). The SEDA-Coding identifies 
different types of micro-level (e.g., auditory, sensorimotor sensations) and macro-level 
experiences (e.g., dream-like, out of body experiences). Micro-level experiences are atomistic 
and cannot be subdivided into further modalities, whereas macro-level experiences consist of 
micro-level experiences that may or may not form more complex macro-forms of 
consciousness. Compared to other available instruments for classification of intraoperative 
experiences (e.g., Mashour et al., 2010), the SEDA-Coding includes additional categories that 
clinically might be less relevant, for example, visual experiences or time perception, but may 
have fundamental importance for the experimental research of phenomenal consciousness 
during sedation and anaesthesia. Instead of focusing on different modalities of experiences, 
the O-PC-Dreams of Study II was designed with an aim to scale subjective dream reports 
according to their overall perceptual complexity, with score 1 referring to a single isolated 
experience and score 7 referring to the most complex sets of experiences within changing 
hallucinatory sceneries. Compared to the original version of Orlinsky’s Sleep Mentation Scale 
(Farthing, 1992; Orlinsky, 1962), the O-PC-Dreams omitted the category of white dreaming 
because of its uncertain status, i.e. given that the contents of white dreaming are unknown, 
they cannot be correctly placed on the scale. Both of the developed content analysis methods 
proved to be reliable and yielded strong inter-judge agreement (Studies I, II, see Sections 6.2, 
6.3). They also proved to be empirically meaningful and helped to identify important aspects 
of subjective experiences in unresponsive states, for example, the relatively high frequency of 
subjective experiences under dexmedetomidine sedation (Study I, see Section 6.2), and the 
predominantly static nature of the early night NREM sleep dreaming (Study II, see Section 6.3). 
As an alternative to the use of formalized content analyses systems, which may be 
sensitive in identifying specific experiences under interest but may also miss other important 
aspects of conscious experiences, an unguided analysis was carried out when comparing sleep 
and waking mentation reports in Study III (see Section 6.3). Four independent blind judges 
were instructed to read the subjective reports and rate their origin (dreaming/waking) and 
reporter (schizophrenia patient/healthy control). Thus, instead of focusing on specific aspects 
of reports, judges rated the overall content of subjective experiences. This approach appeared 
to be successful and yielded significant results: while judges had no difficulties in 
differentiating between waking and dream reports of a control group, they could not 
distinguish above chance level reports of psychotic schizophrenia patients, suggesting a strong 
phenomenological similarity between dreaming and waking psychosis (see also Hadjez, 2003; 
Hobson, 2001; Skrzypińska & Szmigielska, 2013). Arguably, unguided classification of 
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subjective experiences into pre-determined dichotomous categories, such as waking/dreaming 
or patient/control (see Study III, see Section 6.4), might be a simple but efficient method to 
treat the first-person data in neurophenomenological research (Lutz & Thompson, 2003; 
Varela, 1996). 
Research of ASCs requires establishment of a baseline state of consciousness, yet it is not 
always self-evident which state should be taken as a baseline condition for a particular 
alteration of consciousness. In the present dissertation, experimental feasibility of different 
contrast conditions was tested for three classical ASCs, hypnosis (Study VII, see Section 6.8), 
sedation (Study I, see Section 6.2) and dreaming (Study II, see Section 6.3). In hypnosis studies, 
perceptual or cognitive changes are often tested by giving suggestions that are expected to 
alter the brain function of interest (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2009). It is usually expected that a 
contrast between cognitive or behavioural responses to the suggestions given in and out of 
hypnosis will reveal the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of hypnotic suggestibility. Yet, 
even though such comparisons may reveal mechanisms of specific experiences under 
hypnosis, they are limited in revealing the neural mechanisms of a hypnotic state itself (Kallio 
& Revonsuo, 2003). Instead, a more promising contrast might be between a waking state of 
consciousness and a pure hypnotic state when no suggestions are given, which is sometimes 
called neutral hypnosis (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003; Naish, 2007). In Study VII (see Section 6.8), 
such contrast was carried out in a single participant, hypnosis virtuoso T.S.-H., who has 
previously taken part in a series of EEG studies (Fingelkurts Al. et al., 2007; Fingelkurts An. et 
al., 2007; Kallio et al., 1999), serving as an efficient case model to study neural mechanisms of 
neutral hypnosis. However, it was not tested in previous studies if T.S.-H. is capable of carrying 
out long lasting, cognitively demanding behavioural tasks in a deep hypnotic state. In Study VII, 
the neutral hypnosis-induced changes in perception of sub-second intervals were reliably 
detected in a single participant when waking and hypnotic states were relatively rapidly 
switched, avoiding prolonged periods of hypnotic induction and recovery. Interestingly, T.S.-H. 
improved her time perception in hypnosis, pointing out that behavioural tasks for studying 
highly susceptible individuals should be programmed to avoid ceiling effects, as performance 
accuracy might significantly increase during hypnosis. 
The choice of contrast conditions is particularly complicated when studying unresponsive 
states, as the confound of forgetting cannot be avoided when subjective reports are collected 
after regaining of responsiveness. In this dissertation, subjective experiences under sedation 
were successfully analysed by contrasting the effects of different anaesthetic/sedative agents. 
For instance, the frequency of laboratory-related experiences was found to be higher during 
sevoflurane compared to dexmedetomidine sedation (Study I, see Section 6.2). These findings 
suggest that there is no single route of transition from relaxed waking to unconscious 
anaesthesia, and that administration of different anaesthetic agents brings out different rates 
or types of subjective experiences until consciousness is lost. Another possible comparison 
condition for an unresponsive alteration of consciousness may be an unconscious state; 
arguably, contrasting them may reveal the neural correlates of consciousness (Revonsuo, 
2006). In Study II (see Section 6.3), NREM sleep stage 3 was identified as the most suitable 
awakening time for experiments aiming to contrast similar proportions of dream and 
dreamless periods of sleep when the sleep stage is kept constant. Notably, it is particularly 
important to control the sleep stage in studies aiming to identify the neural correlates of 
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dreaming, because the frequently performed contrast between REM sleep dreaming and 
NREM dreamless sleep (e.g., Massimini et al., 2010) may turn out to be a hardly interpretable 
comparison of different sleep stages which vary in many different cognitive or 
neurophysiological functions. 
While it is feasible to carry out case studies aiming to identify perceptual or cognitive 
changes during alterations of consciousness (Study VII, see Section 6.8), larger participant 
samples are necessary in order to draw more general conclusions. Unfortunately, practical 
constraints often limit data collection from large groups of participants undergoing natural or 
induced ASCs, which is particularly problematic in dream research (Study V, see Section 6.6). 
To increase efficiency of collection of dream reports in the sleep laboratory, a novel ENSA 
paradigm was tested in Study II (see Section 6.3). Continuous interruption of the natural 
development of sleep cycles proved to be an efficient way of collecting NREM sleep reports, 
yielding on average eight reports in three hours while maintaining the stable profile of pre-
awakening EEG spectral power. Given that NREM sleep dreams appeared to be perceptually 
simple and static, the ENSA paradigm is suitable for studying minimal forms of consciousness. 
A recent extension of serial awakenings to the whole night recording can be applied to study 
more complex REM sleep dreams (Siclari et al., 2013). 
7.2. Theoretical advancements 
While the field of consciousness studies, especially visual awareness research, is dominated by 
experiments on specific isolated contents of consciousness (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010), 
an alternative approach to focus on the totality of subjective experiences in different states of 
consciousness may provide new perspectives for studying subjectivity. In particular, research 
of the overall stream of subjective experiences and their changes may reveal the global 
properties and internal structure of consciousness, which are not necessarily observable when 
focusing on a single isolated experience in standard behavioural experiments. For instance, 
Study II (see Section 6.3) showed that minimal forms of consciousness exist during early night 
NREM sleep: awakened participants reported seeing static visual images, suggesting that a 
broad perceptual or semantic context and temporal dynamics are not necessary for a 
conscious experience to arise. It seems that the stream of consciousness can stop developing; 
yet, conscious experiences do not necessarily cease. Furthermore, a follow-up study showed 
that the experience of time can arise irrespective of the absence of temporal changes of 
experiences, as research participants often rated their static dreams to last for 30 s, 1 min and 
even longer (Noreika et al., 2010c). These observations indicate that subjective experiences 
maintain the temporal structure even in the most minimal static forms of dreams, confirming 
that temporality, i.e., extension in time, is a fundamental property of phenomenal 
consciousness (see Section 2.2.1). 
It has been suggested that dreaming, the most common and paradigmatic ASC, could be 
treated as a research model of other states consciousness (Hobson, 2001; Revonsuo, 2006). 
However, Study V (see Section 6.6) suggests that even though many perceptual and cognitive 
processes are similar between dreaming and psychosis (Studies III, IV, see Sections 6.4, 6.5) or 
between dreaming and standard waking consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006), proposals to use 
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dreaming as a research model of consciousness are not currently achievable due to 
theoretical, adequacy and practical feasibility limitations. Instead, the more modest 
phenomenological and neurophysiological contrasts between different alterations of 
consciousness are more likely to reveal the neurocognitive mechanisms shared by different 
ASCs. For instance, comparison of the overall stream of experiences in schizophrenia patients 
and healthy individuals showed that in some cases the psychotic and the dreaming minds 
might be indistinguishable (Study III, see Section 6.4). This finding points to the clinical 
importance of systematic contrasts between different states of consciousness. In particular, 
schizophrenia patients may experience similar delusions in their waking life and dreaming, 
although this does not seem to hold for each type of delusion (D’Agostino et al., 2013), 
showing simultaneous continuity and discontinuity between psychotic waking and dreaming 
states of consciousness (Study IV, see Section 6.5). 
Two different types of contrasts between ASCs were considered in Studies I–VIII: a classical 
sharp contrast and a gradual or transitional contrast. A sharp contrast compares an overall ASC 
and a baseline waking state of consciousness (Studies III, VII, see Sections 6.4, 6.8), or several 
different alterations of consciousness (Studies I–III, see Sections 6.2–6.4), which is a standard 
approach in most of the contemporary studies of ASCs. A gradual contrast, suggested in Study 
VI (see Section 6.7), however, systematically maps different degrees of alteration, for example, 
the increasing levels of lucidity in dreams, which may be a more sensitive approach for 
detecting mild distortions of consciousness than a sharp contrast. In particular, a gradual 
contrast might be able to identify temporal dynamics of changing perceptual and cognitive 
functions in the transition from one to another state of consciousness. 
As an alternative to the content analysis of subjective reports, different states of 
consciousness can be tested using the same behavioural paradigms and cognitive modelling 
(Studies VII, VIII, see Sections 6.8, 6.9). In this type of contrasting, a particular promising 
domain is perception of time. Given that temporal binding is the core of the stream of 
consciousness (Dainton, 2006), temporal distortions are very common in natural, induced or 
pathological alterations of consciousness (Study VIII, see Section 6.9). Arguably, a systematic 
comparison of such temporal distortions may reveal shared cognitive processes of different 
states of consciousness. 
Unfortunately, despite the methodological advancements of the content analysis methods, 
reportability and cooperativeness constraints remain major obstacles for drawing decisive 
inferences about the presence or absence of consciousness. Furthermore, even if a conscious 
agent is cooperative and willing to report all experiences, some of them may not be available 
for conscious access due to phenomenological overflow of cognitive accessibility (Block, 1995, 
2007, 2011, see also Sections 2.5.4 and 4.1). In cases when the contents of phenomenal 
consciousness emerge but are not available for access consciousness (Block, 1995), the trap of 
reportability leaves no room for a certainty in the assessment of subjective states. Arguably, it 
may remain impossible to distinguish a genuine dreamless sleep from sleep with forgotten 
dreaming until a necessary and sufficient neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness is 
determined, in which case the stream of consciousness would be assessed by the neural 
activity measures. 
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7.3. The future perspectives for studying alterations of consciousness 
It is expected that future studies of ASCs, while continuing the development of the first-person 
data analyses, will focus on the neural mechanisms of spontaneously generated subjective 
experiences and their distortions. However, instead of correlative EEG or fMRI designs that 
dominate in the contemporary neuroimaging of ASCs, experimental paradigms enabling causal 
interference with the spontaneous neural functioning, such as by non-invasive brain 
stimulation methods TMS or tDCS (as suggested in Study VI, see Section 6.7), will become 
more popular. The first attempts to apply tDCS for studying the neural mechanisms of 
dreaming during REM sleep confirmed homology of brain regions supporting the same type of 
subjective experiences and brain functions in waking and dreaming: tDCS over prefrontal 
regions was associated with increased cognitive insight and lucidity in dreams (Stumbrys et al., 
2013), stimulation of visual cortex induced higher rates of dreamed visual experiences 
(Jakobson et al., 2012), whereas inhibitory stimulation of sensorimotor cortex reduced the 
frequency of dreams with motor activity (Noreika et al., in preparation). Such studies may 
eventually indicate which brain regions, through their excitation or inhibition, lead to various 
distortions of subjective experiences in ASCs. 
When combined with EEG or local field potential measurements, brain stimulation studies 
may also reveal what consequences the altered processing in these regions have for the 
consciousness-related electrodynamics of the widespread cortical networks. Recently, Casali 
and colleagues (2013) applied TMS pulses over different cortical regions during different states 
of consciousness, and measured complexity of widespread EEG responses to the TMS 
perturbation of spontaneous cortical activity. They found that perturbational complexity index 
(PCI) of information integration and differentiation in EEG signal, derived from the information 
integration theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2010, 2012, see Section 2.5.5) successfully 
distinguished different levels of consciousness in sedation, sleep and traumatic brain injury. 
Development of consciousness science in recent years suggests that information integration 
account of consciousness (Tononi, 2010, 2012) may become the most dominant 
neurocognitive theory of consciousness, even though it is not entirely compatible with the 
strong version of biological realism (see Sections 2.4.3 and 2.5.5). However, the current 
version of PCI does not seem to detect the essential theory-driven features of consciousness. 
In particular, PCI does not differ between the ‘eyes closed’ and ‘eyes open’ conditions in 
standard waking state (Casali et al., 2013), ignoring differentiation or phenomenal diversity of 
consciousness. Further developments of PCI and other similar EEG indexes should aim to be 
more sensitive to alterations in both states and contents of consciousness. 
Neuroimaging studies aiming to contrast dreaming and dreamless sleep as conscious and 
unconscious states of mind, as suggested in Study II (see Section 6.3), will need to develop 
empirical arguments for rejection (or acceptance) of a possibility that dreamless sleep is 
forgotten dreaming and thus, a conscious state (Schredl et al., 2013). An ultimate test of it 
would be to check if neural correlates of dreaming, but not of active memory formation or 
working memory updating in response to the stream of internally generated experiences, are 
present during dreamless sleep, which would indicate the presence of dreaming, but absence 
of its recall. However, as long as the neural markers of dreaming or working memory during 
sleep are unknown, the status of dreamless sleep could be investigated indirectly, for 
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example, by studying neural mechanisms underlying white dreaming, when awakened 
participants have a feeling that they were dreaming, but cannot remember any further details 
about it. White dreaming is surprisingly frequent: participants report it when explicitly asked in 
about 40% of early night awakenings from NREM sleep stages 2 and 3 (Study II, see Section 
6.3). White dreaming is also present, but to lesser extent, in sedation reports (Study I, see 
Section 6.2). Arguably, systematic contrasts between white dreaming and dreamless sleep as 
well as between white dreaming and recalled dreams may reveal whether white dreaming is 
more similar to dreams or dreamless sleep, eventually developing paradigms to map active 
memory updating while dreaming, such as those used to study waking memory consolidation 
and reactivation during sleep (Diekelmann et al., 2009; Schönauer et al., 2014). Recently, 
Eichenlaub et al. (2014) introduced a novel approach for studying the neural basis of dream 
recall and its failure: high and low dream recallers were compared using a passive auditory 
oddball paradigm during both wakefulness and sleep. High recallers showed higher P3a 
evoked EEG potentials to rare sounds, indicating a more efficient attention orientation to 
novel sensory information. Interestingly, the same ERP differences between the high and low 
dream recallers were observed during NREM sleep, suggesting that more efficient attentional 
processing is maintained during sleep, which may eventually lead to higher recall of dreamed 
perceptual experiences. Finally, carefully designed studies of behavioural training of dream 
recall in the sleep laboratory, such as presentation of sensory memory cues of possible dream 
content or enhancement of rapid orientation after awakening, may increase dream recall at 
the cost of decreasing white dreaming or even dreamless sleep. Such training would reduce 
the rate of misjudgements of recall categories and would improve the quality of a 
neuroimaging contrast between dreaming and dreamless sleep. 
Interactions between different states of consciousness should also be studied using a 
gradual parametric approach, such as in the transition from non-lucid to pre-lucid to fully-lucid 
dreams (Study VI, see Section 6.7), or between dreams of increasing perceptual complexity 
(Study II, see Section 6.3). Perhaps one of the easiest transitions of conscious states to study 
and manipulate experimentally takes place during sleep onset, when cognitive functions and 
conscious experiences undergo changes from alert to relaxed to drowsy to unresponsive 
states of mind (Goupil & Bekinschtein, 2011). Recently, it was demonstrated that auditory 
perception undergoes spatial distortion in the drowsy state of consciousness, and healthy 
individuals begin showing neglect-like misjudgments regarding sounds coming from the right 
side of their perceptual space (Bareham et al., submitted). Given that space perception is 
closely associated with time perception and processing of other magnitudes (Fabbri et al., 
2012; Walsh, 2003), it is likely that the latter would also be affected by the increasing 
sleepiness. Tracing down changes in these and other cognitive functions as well as the 
underlying neural processes may eventually reveal how an ASC emerges and develops in time. 
Some of the perceptual and cognitive changes might be unique for specific ASCs, such as 
susceptibility to external influences in hypnosis, whereas some other distortions seem to be 
shared by different ASCs, such as changes in time perception, observed in hypnosis, LSD 
psychomodulation, depression, schizophrenia (Studies VII, VIII, see Sections 6.8, 6.9), as well as 
several other mental disorders, including attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Noreika et 
al., 2013) and autism spectrum disorders (Falter et al., 2012). Arguably, continuing research of 
ASCs will lead to better understanding, if not research models (Study V, see Section 6.6), of 
regular waking consciousness and cognition in some of these pathologies. Likewise, several 
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recent studies began to investigate interactions between ASCs and baseline waking states, 
which seem to share the same psychological and neural traits, such as increased attentional 
waking ability in frequent lucid dreamers (Blagrove et al., 2010) and high dream recallers 
(Eichenlaub et al., 2014, see also Ruby et al., 2013), or reduced amygdala volume in 
participants prone to bizarre dreaming (De Gennaro et al., 2011). Future studies may find that 
a relationship between an ASC and a standard waking state is bidirectional with both of them 
having the capability to influence each other (Study IV, see Section 6.5). 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Phenomenal consciousness is dissociable from responsiveness, as subjective experiences 
do occur in unresponsive states of mind, including sedation (Study I, see Section 6.2) and 
sleep (Study II, see Section 6.3). 
2. Efficiency of laboratory research of alterations of consciousness can be increased by 
serially interrupting NREM sleep (Study II, see Section 6.3), or by studying selected 
individuals who show extremely strong forms of an ASC, such as hypnotic virtuosos 
(Study VII, see Section 6.8). 
3. Strong inter-judge agreement can be achieved using both guided (Studies I, II, see 
Sections 6.2, 6.3) and unguided (Study III, see Section 6.4) analyses of subjective reports, 
confirming empirical reliability of phenomenological analysis of alterations of 
consciousness. Relatively rare ASCs, such as lucid dreaming, might be better studied by a 
gradual contrast of subjective changes (Study IV, see Section 6.5). 
4. Content-wise, dreaming and waking mentation reports collected from psychotic patients 
can be indistinguishable for blind judges (Study III, see Section 6.4), indicating a close 
resemblance of these states of consciousness. 
5. Despite phenomenological similarities, dreaming should not be treated as a uniform 
research model of psychotic or intact stream of consciousness (Study V, see Section 6.6). 
On the contrary, there seems to be a multiplicity of routes of how different states of 
consciousness, such as dreaming and psychosis, can be associated (Study IV, see Section 
6.5). 
6. Time perception distortions observed in hypnosis (Study VII, see Section 6.8) are also 
common in other alterations of consciousness (Study VIII, see Section 6.9). Yet, despite 
cognitive similarity, the mechanisms of such temporal changes might be different and 
cognitive modelling-driven comparative research is needed in order to identify the 
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